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3Abstract
The Story of the European Fast Reactor Cooperation
This report is a condensed history of European cooperation in the large breeder power
plants with powers in excess of 1000 MWe. The beginning, in 1973, was marked by the
so-called Utilities' Convention signed by EdF, RWE, and ENEL on the construction of
Superph€mix and SNR 2. In 1977, cooperation began among the reactor vendors and
R&D organizations in France, Germany and Italy as weil as Belgium and the
Netherlands. After the British had joined in 1984, planning for the European Fast
Reactor, EFR, was started in 1988. The conceptual design phase of the 1500 MWe
breeder power plant covered aperiod of five years and was concluded with an
economic assessment and a technical safety analysis of EFR in 1983. A number of
ongoing studies are being conducted within a specific EFR program.
Kurzfassung
Geschichte der europäischen Zusammenarbeit
beim Schnellen Brüter
Der Bericht schildert die Geschichte der europäischen Zusammenarbeit bei den großen
Schnellbrüteranlagen mit einer Kraftwerksleistung über 1000 MWe. Sie begann 1973
mit der Unterzeichnung der sog. EVU-Konvention zwischen EdF, RWE und ENEL zum
Bau von Superphenix und SNR 2. 1977 kam es zu einer Kooperation der Reaktorher-
steller und F+E-Organisationen in den Ländern Frankreich, Deutschland und Italien,
sowie Belgien und den Niederlanden. Nach dem Beitritt der Briten (1984) wurde 1988
mit der Planung des European Fast Reactors EFR begonnen. Die technische Konzipie-
rung dieses 1500 MWe Brüterkraftwerks erstreckte sich über 5 Jahre und wurde 1983
mit einer wirtschaftlichen Bewertung und sicherheitstechnischen Analyse des EFR ab-
geschlossen. Einige nachlaufende Studien werden im Rahmen eines gesonderten
EFR-Programms fortgeführt.
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1. An Encouraging Start
(1971-1984)
2. A Thorny Path to the Common Model Breeder
(1984-1989)
3. The EFR Conceptual Design Phase
(1988-1990)
4. The EFR Concept Validation Phase
(1990-1993)
5. The End of the EFR Project
(1992-1993)
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Preface
The history of European cooperation in large breeder plants with powers in excess of
1000 MWe begins in 1973, when the so-called Utilities' Convention was signed. This
triggered the construction of Superphenix and the planning of SNR 2. 1977 saw coop-
eration beginning among the vendors and the R&D organizations in France, Germany,
Italy, and in Belgium and the Netherlands; the United Kingdom joined soon. A particu-
larly important milestone is constituted by the agreements on the European Fast Reac-
tor of 1989. Under the leadership of EFRUG, the utilities' consortium, the vendors' con-
sortium, EFR Associates, was commissioned to plan EFR, a 1500 MWe breeder power
plant. The R&D organizations in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom agreed to
back the project by contributing research findings.
This report is a chronicle of these phases of European breeder cooperation. It ends
with the completion of the second phase of the EFR project.
Many colleagues, whom I would Iike to thank, have helped me in collecting and pre-
senting these events. Special thanks are due to Mr. Ralf Friese of the Karlsruhe
Nuclear Research Center for his translation into English of my report. I am also greatly
indebted to my secretary, Ms. Ruth Klausmann-Stern, who not only typed the script, but
also compiled the extensive list of references.
Cooperation in the European breeder projects has been an experience which has
greatly influenced me and, I am sure, many of my colleagues and friends.
It is for this reason that I
dedicate
this report to all my colleagues who participated in EFR
and the other large breeder projects.
We owe them gratitude, and this report is a tribute to their achievements.
Dr. Willy Marth
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Vorwort
Die Geschichte der europäischen Zusammenarbeit bei den Großbrüteranlagen über
1000 MWe Leistung beginnt 1973 mit der Unterzeichnung der sog. EVU-Konvention.
Sie war das Signal zur Errichtung des Superphenix und für die Planung des SNR 2.
1977 kam es zur Zusammenarbeit auf Seiten der Hersteller und der F+E-Organisatio-
nen in Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien sowie Belgien und den Niederlanden, der bald
danach auch die Briten beigetreten sind. Einen besonders wichtigen Meilenstein
bildeten die Abkommen zum European Fast Reactor im Jahre 1989. Unter der Führung
des EVU-Konsortiums EFRUG wurde der Herstellerverbund EFR Associates mit der
Planung des EFR, eines 1500 MWe Brüterkraftwerks beauftragt. Die F+E-Organisatio-
nen in Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien verpflichteten sich zur Absicherung
des Projekts durch Beistellung von Forschungsergebnissen.
Dieser Bericht zeichnet die genannten Etappen dieser europäischen Brüterzusammen-
arbeit nach und endet mit dem Abschlu ß der zweiten Phase des Projekts EFR.
Bei der Zusammenstellung der Ereignisse haben mich viele Kollegen unterstützt, bei
denen ich mich nachdrücklich bedanken mächte. Besonderer Dank gebührt Herrn
Ralf Friese vom Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, der die Übertragung ins Englische
besorgt hat. Recht herzlich bedanke ich mich auch bei meiner Sekretärin Frau
Ruth Klausmann-Stern, der nicht nur das Schreiben des Manuskripts sondern auch die
umfangreiche Erstellung des Literaturverzeichnisses oblag.
Die Zusammenarbeit bei den europäischen Brüterprojekten war für mich und sicherlich
auch für viele meiner Mitarbeiter und Freunde ein prägendes Ereignis.
Ich mächte deshalb diesen Bericht all meinen Kollegen
widmen
die am EFR und den übrigen Großbrüterprojekten mitgewirkt haben.
Ihnen allen gebührt Dank; dieser Bericht soll ihre Verdienste festhalten.
Dr. Willy Marth
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1 An Encouraging Start
1.1 The Utilities' Convention
The electricity utilities initiated European fast breeder cooperation.
As early as in 1970, representatives of the French Electricite de France (EdF), the
German Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk (RWE), and the Italian Ente Nazio-
nale per l'Energia Elettrica (ENEL) met to explore the possibilities of drafting joint
purchasing contracts for fast breeders in the power category around 1000 MWe. If one
bears in mind that the 250 MWe Phenix reactor in Marcoule in France was just under
construction at that time, and the German SNR 300 had barely entered into its planning
phase, this approach by the electricity utilities marked a step into a distant future.
Arrangement of components in pool and
loop-type reactors.
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Negotiations proceeded smoothly,
and a written letter of intent about
the joint purchase and operation of
two breeder reactors of 1000 MWe
each was signed already in July
1971. The first plant was to be built
in France in 1974/75, Le. approxi-
mately one year after the sched-
uled commissioning date of the
Phenix reactor and, like that plant,
was to have a primary system de-
signed in the so-calied pool config-
uration. The second breeder, a loop-type plant, was to follow in Germany in 1977/78,
where RWE was still hoping at that time to commission SNR 300 in 1976.1
A few months later, the Technicatome reactor engineering company was established on
the French side, mainly as an offshoot of the Reactor Construction Division of the
Commissariat Ei l'Energie Atomique (CEA). It was owned by CEA (90%) and EdF (10%),
managed by Remy Carle, and commissioned to draft a planning study of the French
large breeder reactor on behalf of the privately owned Groupement Atomique
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Alsacienne Atlantique (GAAA), a company already engaged in the Phenix project as ar-
chitect-engineer.
Yet, it took until 1973 for the agreement on cooperation among the electricity utilities to
be signed. The main reason for the delay was the difficulty the two state-owned power
utilities, EdF and ENEL, experienced in establishing international operating companies
under private law, which they were barred from doing under their statutes. They first
had to seek the agreement of their governments. In Italy, which passed through a num-
ber of government crises at that time, that permit took quite a while to come forth.
• RWE's share was laken over by SBK
in 1975 (70% RWE).
European fast breeder cooperation
under the utilities' convention of 1973.
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On December 28, 1973, EdF, ENEL, and RWE at long last signed the so-calied Utili-
ties' Convention on the joint purchase and operation of the two Superphenix and SNR 2
breeder power plants of (now) 1200 MWe. 2 In July 1974, Centrale Nucleaire Europeen-
ne a Neutrons Rapides S.A. (NERSA) was founded as a company under French law,
with its headquarters in Paris, to manage the
French Superphenix project. Its opposite number,
Europäische Schnellbrüter-Kernkraftwerksgesell-
schaft mbH (ESK), a company under German law
with its headquarters in Essen, was to manage
SNR 2. The majority partners holding 51% each
were EdF in the case of NERSA, and RWE in the
case of ESK. The minority partners in each case
held 16%; ENEL held 33% in each project. The
RWE holdings in NERSA and ESK later were
transferred to SBK, thus allowing Belgian
(Electrabel), Dutch (SEP) and British (NE) part-
ners to join. As the delivery contract for SNR 300
had been concluded in the meantime, and as it
contained a provision for commissioning the plant
in 1979, the start of construction of SNR 2 was
not to be expected before 1980.3,4,5
The French-German-Italian operators' consortium had no comparable group as its op-
posite number on the vendors' side. There were, however, consortial agreements be-
tween Nucleare Italiana Reattori Avanzati (NIRA) and the French planners and vendors
mentioned above, based on licensing agreements and an R&D contract, for a term of
fifteen years, between CEA and the Italian Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare
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(CNEN). The German reactor vendors, Kraftwerk Union (KWU) and its subsidiary,
INTERATOM, were not included, although they would have been quite willing to join
the consortium of SuperphElnix vendors.6 ,7
The reason, in addition to a slight hesitancy on the French side, was the express desire
of the German partner, RWE, to avoid a monopoly on the vendors' side. Against the
backdrop of the quasi-monopoly KWU held in light water reactor power plants in Ger-
many, the decision had been taken to prevent a similar development in the breeder
field. "All we want is competition," RWE Executive Board member Heinrich Mandel is
quoted to have said in an interview by "Nucleonics Week."8 However, RWE then saw to
it that 16% of the delivery volume of Superphenix was earmarked for German suppliers.
For various reasons, though, that percentage was never fully exploited.
1.1.1 Breeder Reactor Experiences in France and Germany
Let us now take a look at the experiences with smaller breeder reactors existing in part
in France and Germany. Those experiences had to be taken into account by the utilities
unless unacceptable risks were to arise to the planned large breeders. In the interest of
presenting a compact outline, the breeder-related research program in the seventies
will not becovered, and only the status of the national reactor plants, Rapsodie/Phenix
and KNKlSNR 300, respectively, will be described.
France: Rapsodie - Phenix
Unimpeded by any political consequences of the war, France was able to embark on
breeder research early on. The first sodium experiments were run in 1953. From that
date on, the Cadarache Research Center worked specifically on plans for a small sodi-
um-cooled experimental breeder called RAPSODIE. After the partial meltdown of the
Mark 11 metal core load in the American EBR I Experimental Power Plant in Novem-
ber 1955, Rapsodie was equipped with an oxide core and with safety systems able to
withstand mechanical energy releases of up to 250 MJ in a Bethe-Tait accident. The
reactor, incidentally a loop design, went critical in 1967. Three years later, its power
was raised from 24 to 40 MWth to achieve a higher neutron flux for irradiation.9
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In its nearly fifteen years of operation the Rapsodie reactor attained the high availability
of more than 2700 full-Ioad days. Throughout its life it was used to irradiate a large
number of materials and fuels, especially for the follow-on model, PhEmix, but also, for
a fee, for the early Karlsruhe breeder program.
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Prior to final decommissioning, how-
ever, a number of transient experi-
ments to verify the dynamic proper-
ties of the reactor were conducted
wh ich won worldwide recognition.
The positive safety characteristics
which, so far, had only been as-
sumed from theoretical calculations,
were confirmed in the most convinc-
ing way. For instance, in a simulated
complete power fai lu re case without
the absorber rods dropping, the re-
actor shut down automatically and the plant consequently changed into the safe oper-
ati ng status.
In 1978, the Rapsodie reactor vessel developed a microcrack through which approxi-
mately 10 grams of sodium escaped over aperiod of one year. When the small leak re-
mained undetected and, four years
later, a major nitrogen leak in the
double tank occurred, the decision
was taken in 1983 to decommission
and dismantle the plant.
Construction of the next plant, the PHENIX breeder power plant of 250 MWe, was be-
gun in late 1968. Again, CEA was the builder and operator, and Georges Vendryes,
head of the French breeder development, was the prime mover. The site was to be
Marcoule on the Rh6ne River, not far from the famous vineyards of Chäteauneuf-du-
Pape. After almost five years of construction, with a maximum of 700 persons working
on the building site, the plant went critical for the first time in August 1973 and was con-
nected to the power grid at its rated power as early as in April 1974. The overall con-
struction cost, the fuel not included, amounted to FF 620 million, which meant that the
original estimate had been exceeded by less than 10%.
PMnix fast breeder plant in Marcoule.
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Over its first ten years, which will be briefly sketched below, the Phemix plant achieved
an excellent operating record. Despite some faults to be discussed below, the average
load factor between 1974 and
1984 attained the surprisingly
high level, for a prototype, of
almost 60%.10
After nearly two years of
smooth operation, cracks were
detected in 1976 in several
welds of the cover plates in the
top part of the intermediate
heat exchangers, which caused
secondary sodium to leak out.
The decision was taken to re-
place successively the six
units, which were identical in
design. Repairing the heat exchangers took eighteen months, in which the reactor was
operated mostly at part load. After washing and decontamination, the large units had a
residual radiation level of less than 10mrem, which greatly facilitated repair work. It is
for this reason that the personnel engaged in that intervention were exposed to the
surprisingly low total dose of only 14 man-rem.
The second major defect arose in 1982/83, when four consecutive sodium-water inter-
actions occurred in the reheaters of the steam generators as a result of materials fa-
tigue at a point subjected to particularly high loads. Thanks to the modular design of
the steam generators it was possible to repair these defects at relatively short notice,
thus preventing them from having a major impact on the availability of the power
plant. 11
In the ten years covered in this review, Phenix suffered only eight fuel element c1adding
failures, mainly with experimental subassemblies. Thanks to the excellent localization
system it was possible to identify the faulty elements within 5 - 10 minutes. Replacing
the elements detected in this way by fresh ones merely took some 50 hours of reactor
downtime. As a consequence, rod defects in Phenix had but liHle influence on the avail-
ability and operating record of the plant. In the interest of reprocessing the spent fuel
elements it was decided in October 1978 to enlarge the existing SAP reprocessing
PMnix operating histogram 1974-1983.
plant by the TOR head end. The new
plant had a throughput of 5 tons per
year and was able, as a consequence,
to provide back-end fuel cycle ser-
vices both for Phenix and for the
Karlsruhe KNK II plant. 12
The Phenix reactor turned out to be so
successful that CEA at times planned
a 450 MWe stretch-out version. AI-
though some interest was shown by
Japanese, Indian, and American elec-
tricity utilities, the plans came to noth-
ing.
Germany: KNK - SNR 300
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The German Breeder Program differed markedly from the French one; its timing was
different from the outset, it was managed differently, and it was much more subject to
political influences ~nd other factors.
Up until 1955, the Allied powers of the Second World War had barred the Federal Re-
public of Germany from doing any work in the nuclear fjeld. After Germany had re-
gained its sovereignty and, at the same time, renounced the development of nuclear
weapons, the first nuclear research centers, such as Karlsruhe (KfK), were founded in
1956. In 1960, Wirtz and Häfele established the Fast Breeder Project within KfK with
the energetic support by the Federal Research Ministry officials Schuster and
Schmidt-Küster13. As late as 1965, however, the first large sodium test rig was commis-
sioned by Interatom in Bensberg. In 1973, construction of SNR 300 was started at
Kalkar, almost at the same time at which the French Phenix breeder, nearly equal in
size, was commissioned. In a nutshell, it can be said that, because of the consequen-
ces of the war, France was one plant ahead of Germany in breeder development.
Also the administrative setups chosen for the projects were different. Building the KNK
and SNR 300 power plants was a responsibility of industry (Interatom and INB/lnter-
atom, respectively); the plants were operated by regional electricity utilities (Badenwerk
19
and SBKlRWE, respectively). The nuclear research centers focused on the accom-
panying research programs. The licensing procedure under the German Atomic Energy
Act for KNK and SNR 300 was identical with that applying to commerciallight water re-
actor plants. Added to this were major legal and political problems and persistent diffi-
culties in gaining public acceptance. Compared with this situation, the French breeder
projects for a long time were carried by a spirit of public approval and consent.
By 1982, KNK 11 had attained burnups of
approximately 100,000 MWd/t; a couple
of fuel elements had been reprocessed
KNK experimental breeder plant in Karlsruhe. in the MILLI pilot reprocessing plant of
KfK, and the recovered plutonium had
been recycled. In the course of reactor operation, occasional argon bubbles permeated
the core; these defects, which were not safety-related, were repaired. In 1983, KNK 11
was loaded with so-called Mk. 11 fuel elements, which were larger in diameter and were
identical with the specifications of the SN R 300 reload core. 14
Construction of the Compact Sodium-cooled Nuclear Reactor (KNK) was begun by
Interatom at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center in 1965 on the base of a fixed-
price contract. The KNK I version was
designed as a thermal reactor with a ura-
nium oxide core, but had a 20 MWe tur-
bo-generator. After a phase of operation
in 1971 - 1974, the plant was converted
into a fast reactor (KNK 11) with a mixed
oxide core in the inner test zone in
1975 - 1977. The reason was the need
for irradiation capacity for the SNR 300
follow-on plant.
And now on to SNR 300, a breeder power plant of 300 MWe power. After preliminary
work at KfK, it was planned under the leadership of Interatom together with Belgo-
nucleaire and Neratoom from 1966 onward; in 1972, it was ordered by a German-Bel-
gian-Netherlands operators' consortium under the leadership of RWE. In the final de-
sign phase, the German licensing authorities had imposed major changes, such as the
installation of an external, actively cooled core catcher; enclosure of the reactor build-
20
ing for protection against high-speed military aircraft; and the design of the entire plant
against major seismic events.
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Schematic flow scheme of the SNR 300
fast breeder plant in Kalkar.
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After a brisk start, construction slowed down considerably from 1976 on, because the
licensing authority of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia had made the hypothetical
care meltdown accident according to the Bethe-Tait model practically a design basis
accident of the compo-
nents and systems of
the plant. Installing the
reactor vessel support
girder, an item on the
critical path for Kalkar,
was impossible because
the part had been de-
c1ared a safety-related
compone~ on which a
large number of compli-
cated calculations had
to be performed first.
Moreover, strain mea-
surements had to be conducted on wide-plate specimen of the vessel in order to deter-
mine experimentally the accommodation of "Bethe-Tait pressures."15
Problems arose also in the legal field. The German Federal Constitutional Court in
Karlsruhe was made to examine in 1977 whether the SNR 300 fast breeder could be
licensed at all under the existing German Atomic Energy Act. In its ruling of August
1978, the Court answered that question in the affirmative, but only after a whole year
had been spent in which the project had not progressed.
The next political obstacle arose very soon. In December 1978, the German Federal
Parliament decided to establish a Committee of Inquiry into the Future Nuclear Energy
Policy, especially the Kalkar SNR 300 project. The Committee met for an incredibly
long period of nearly four years, for which the project lay practically dormant. By in-
volving experts pro and con, the Members of Parliament sought to obtain information
about all technical, economic, and political aspects of the project. The interplay of vari-
ous coefficients of reactivity in the core of SNR 300 was among the points treated,
Map showing the site of the
Superphenix fast breeder plant.
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others being the risk of containment break and the possibility to replace the uranium
blanket by a thorium blanket.
The Kalkar project had fallen into a very deep hole indeed. 16
1.1.2 The Superphenix and SNR 2 Projects
Let us come back to the Superphenix and SNR 2 projects, which had been decided
upon as a result of the Utilities' Convention of 1973 as described above. Under this
heading, we will be looking approximately as far as 1982.
Superphenix
Planning the engineered safeguards features of Superphenix began quite early: In
1972, the Nuclear Safety Department of CEA drafted recommendations for the safety
criteria of the reactor in order to give guidance to the designers; shortly after, the Pre-
liminary Safety Report (1974) and the
Manual of Design and Construction
Rules (1976) were pUblished.17 ,18
The Superphenix design provided for
a nuclear steam supply system as an
integrated pool-type version with a
thermal power of 3000 MWth and a
plant power of 1200,MWe to be gener-
ated by two turbosets. The four prima-
ry and secondary circuits in a reactor
vessel of 21 m diameter fed one heli-
cal-tube steam generator each of the
considerable capacity of 750 MWth.
The cylindrical reactor building was 64 m in diameter and 80 m high. In many respects,
the technical design of Superphenix was a logical extension of the successful Phenix
concept. One exception to this rule were the steam generators, which had been
modular in the smaller plant. 19
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The power plant was to be sited on the territory of the municipality of Creys ap-
proximately one kilometer from the village of Malville, both situated in the Isere
Department on the Rh6ne River, approximately halfway between Lyons and Geneva.
Protests against the breeder project in Creys-Malville later were raised again and again
from Geneva in Switzerland.
In April 1976, the then French President, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, approved the pro-
ject. As a consequence, ground breaking work and the installation of the necessary
utility systems were begun on site. In 1977, project work in Creys-Malville started for
good, accompanied by one of the biggest anti-nuclear demonstrations France had ex-
perienced so far, which resulted in one person being killed and approximately one
hundred being injured.
On-site assembly tor Superphenix.
4: supports;
5: rails;
6: shop.
1: reactor building;
2: gantry crane;
3: crane tracks;
Because of the size of the components, which measured up to 25 m in diameter and
weighed up to 850 t, a fully equipped shop had to be set up on the premises. The con-
siderable dimen-
sions of 114 m
length, 75 m width,
and 38 m height,
and a floor area of
nearly 10,000 m2,
made it the most
impressive build-
ing on the con-
struction site. The
parts delivered by
the vendors were
moved into the
shop, assembled into large components and then moved on special crane tracks into
the installation opening of the reactor building.
Construction of Superphenix progressed smoothly. In 1981, the reactor vessel with the
two rotating top shields was installed in the finished reactor building. The primary
pumps had been delivered on site by that date, as had been 1400 t of sodium. The
main contractor for the heat supply system was the French Novatome company estab-
lished 1977, partly as an offshoot of CEA. The turbo-generators were supplied by the
23
Italian consortial partner, Ansaldo-NIRA. Various small contracts were shared by the
German suppliers, Siemens, Interatom, and BBC.
Naturally, there were also setbacks. In 1980, the
polar crane was to be tested in the reactor build-
ing, but the test weight of 420 t oscillated strongly
and crashed.
North-south section,
scale 0 10 m.
Old and modern cathedrals
(Ieft: Reims, right: Creys-Malville).
The world's largest breeder construction site, with huge components to be marveled at,
attracted an extraordinarily large number of technically interested or merely curious
visitors. In the first six months of 1981, nearly 17,000 people came for a visit, among
them, of course, many school c1asses; but also
ministers, even former US President Gerald Ford,
were anxious to have a look at this monument in
the valley of the Rhöne River. 20
One strange experience occurred in January
1982: Superphenix was bombarded and hit by
bazooka missiles. A regular missile launcher later
was found on the opposite bank of the River
Rhöne, some 250 m fram the reactor. Five mis-
siles had been fired fram there, four had hit the
reactor building, one even managing to get inside
thraugh the assembly opening, where it hit a
girder and fell down. Fortunately, the technical damage caused by this missile attack
was relatively slight. As a consequence, the surroundings of the power plant were kept
under stricter surveillance.
SNR 2
While Superphenix was already under construction, its German counterpart, SNR 2,
was just about to reach its technical planning stage. In 1976, ESK, the consortium of
utilities, commissioned the German-Belgian-Netherlands manufacturer, INB, to preplan
a 1300 MWe breeder on the basis of a loop-type concept. Initially, an electric net power
of 2000 MWe had been envisaged in order to benefit fram economies of scale, but this
was soon reduced to the standard size of light water reactors so as not to make the
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Organization ehart of SNR 2.
Design and
Construction SNR 2 1---1-_-'
Here are the main parameters of the power
plant design finally proposed to ESK, the
client: The reactor core was to be a homoge-
neous core with two enrichment zones and
3400 MWth thermal power; the plutonium in-
ventory was to be seven tons. Outside the
core barrel there were interim storage posi-
tions for spent fuel elements. The reactor
vessel was 15 m in diameter and was closed
by a tripie shield at the top which was to be cooled by nitrogen. Unlike SNR 300, SNR 2
was to have neither agas bubble separator nor an external core catcher. 21 ,22
licensing procedure too complicated. Preplanning took approximately up until 1981;
however, as will be outlined below, it was interrupted temporarily for closer analysis of
the French Superphenix design ("pool analy-
sis").
Secondary Piping
Arrangement of SNR 2 primary and
seeondary systems.
O -ReactorVesselSecondaryReaeler VesselPrestressed... _----- ... - __ ~ Conerale Vessel
Each of the four secondary systems was equipped
with two steam generators of 435 MWth each. For
maximum availability, the power plant was to be
run at its rated load with merely seven systems of
this type. Two different systems were proposed for decay heat removal: The residual
heat either was to be passed from immersion coolers in the reactor vessel to air
The four-train primary system was based on a novel pot concept. The circuit vessel as
the primary cell constituted the common cavity of a primary system inerted with nitro-
gen. This design offered a number of advantages: The pipes did not have to be in-
sulated, nor did they require trace heating; both facts made for better accessibility.
Moreover, the systems boundary was relatively
simple in geometry and offered greater flexibility in
pressure and temperature design. Together with
the double tank and the reactor top shield cavity,
the circuit vessels made up the inner containment.
The hot hangers and dampers still to be developed
for the pot concept were an important part of the
R&D program accompanying the planning phase.23
25
coolers, or through the primary system to special exchange components in the inter-
mediate heat exchangers.
In contrast to the SNR 300 design, the Bethe-Tait accident was to be controlled by
preventive measures in SNR 2. Consequently, no specific provisions were made
against molten fue!. As far as materials were concerned, the leak-before-break criterion
was assumed to apply, and no multiple pipe break of the steam generators without de-
pressurization was considered. 24
The SNR 2 safety philosophy was to approach customary international standards.
1.2 R&D and Industrial Agreements
Interconnections and shares in European breeder cooperation.
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Emulating the examples of the electricity utilities, also the research organizations and
vendors tried to intensify, and define contractually, the German-French ties. The way
was paved by the so-called Declaration of Nice in which the then German Federal
Minister for Research, Matthöfer, and his French colleague d'Ornano decided to inten-
sify the cooperation of both
countries in the breeder
field. In the wake of that
.!'!
agreement, lengthy negoti- ~
..c
ations took place between ~
c
'"German and French organi- Licenses for use
are granted by:
zations, in which also their
associated partners in Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and
Italy were involved. On July
5, 1977, at last, a number
of agreements on coopera-
tion among research cen-
ters and industry were signed, and also the rules about the protection and use of
know-how were agreed upon.25 Here is abrief rundown of the most important agree-
ments:
(1) The research centers agreed on complete exchanges of existing and future
breeder know-how and on harmonizing future R&D work with the needs of reactor
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facilities to be built. The contracting parties, on the one hand, were the Entwick-
lungsgemeinschaft Schneller Brüter made up of KfK and Interatom (with Belgo-
nucleaire/CEN, Mol, and Neratoom/ECN, Petten) and, on the other hand, the
French CEA (with the Italian CNEN). Alkem was no party to the agreement, as
fuel fabrication had been excluded from the exchange.
(2) The industrial companies, Interatom, Belgonucleaire, and Neratoom, decided to
cooperate closely with Novatome, the main supplier of Superphenix, in order to
achieve a maximum of harmonization in the design of future breeders. In particu-
lar, precise analyses of the advantages and drawbacks of the pool and loop-type
reactor systems were to be performed.
(3) Finally, a joint company was founded, Societe Europeenne pour la Promotion des
Systemes de Reacteurs Rapides a Sodiurn (SERENA), which was to reap the
benefits of the know-how held by the organizations mentioned above, and which
was to act as Iicensor vis-a-vis third parties. The German partners held 35% in
SERENA, the French 65%; at a later point in time, holdings were to be balanced
out in a 49:51 ratio.
These agreements were concluded for aperiod of twenty years. Abrief outline of the
experience accumulated in the first few years of their implementation will be given be-
low.
1.2.1 R&D Cooperation
The purpose of R&D cooperation was to harmonize the R&D programs with the needs
of reactor plants. For this purpose, a German-French Steering Committee ("Comite de
Liaison") was established, whose members were the top ranking representatives of the
contracting parties. Twice a year the Committee reviewed the progress made in the
R&D program and decided on new subjects to be incorporated. The Comite de Liaison
(CdL) was supported by a Secretariat and by nine Technical Working Groups, staffed
equally with two coordinators each, which covered the entire breeder field, from fuel
elements to reactor operating experience. 26
The CdL above all sought to avoid any duplication of effort, which happened quite fre-
quently in the beginning, for both partners began their cooperation with complete Pro-
grams of their own. The German R&D program had been tailored to the needs of
Some of the founding fathers of
German-French breeder cooperation
(Iett to right: H.-H. Hennies, KfK; H. Mausbeck, Interatom;
F. Stosskopf, C. Moranville, J. Megy, all CEA).
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SNR 300 and to German licensing conditions, while the French topics were primarily
aimed at supporting Superphenix. Already at this point the need for harmonization of
the reactor plans became
apparent, if cooperation
was to produce any ratio-
nalization benefit.
One important criterion es-
tablished by the CdL was
/
that new R&D projects to
be incorporated should, if
possible, be planned as
joint German-French pro-
jects in order to make opti-
mum use of manpower and
equipment resources. This
was managed successfully
after some teething trou-
bles. One such joint project was the RACINE experiment in wh ich large plutonium crit-
icals for heterogeneous cores were studied in the French Masurca plant, and of which
a German scientist (Scholtyssek) was appointed Project Manager. In the
CHARLEMAGNE joint irradiation experiment, German and French c1adding tube steel
varieties were irradiated in the Phenix reactor for comparison purposes. The spacer
problem was examined in the Mark li/SAPHIR project. At ane time, the debate about
lattice and wire spacers, respectively, threatened to turn into a religious war among
experts, and management was called upon to end this costly controversy as quickly as
possible. 27
Some experiments, such as the CABRI projects launched already in 1973, were only
monitored by the CdL and kept under fleeting surveillance; their execution was in the
capable hands of their initiators, Tanguy (CEA) and Keßler (KfK) and their staff
(Tattegrain and Kußmaul). There were also projects in which the German side deliber-
ately did not participate, such as the French ESMERALDA sodium fire experiment.
In the first three years of cooperation, roughly 1000 technical reports were exchanged;
so far, all of them were confidential, and in the absence of the agreement there would
have been no possibility to even get a glimpse of them. In addition, 200 meetings at the
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level of experts were organized over that period of time, at which 25 joint experiments
and projects were planned, among other activities. Also pUblications became more and
more "European," as far as their authors were concerned. This clearly impressed the
British, Americans and Japanese, who suddenly found themselves facing a West Euro-
pean "block."
An impression of the magnitude of the R&D program and the associated coordination
problems can be obtained from the annual budgets. Thus, the 1978 R&D budget for the
fast breeder in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and in France and Italy was the
equivalent of US $381 million; the comparable budget of the United States was
US $100 million larger.
1.2.2 Industrial Cooperation
Also Interatom and Novatome, the industrial partners, swapped staft members who
were allowed to study the design basis documents of their respective "competitors"
which, so far, had been strictly confidential. About 30 scientists and engineers were
delegated for years to foreign sites and learned from the respective partners. Names
like Guthmann, Hammers, Heyne and Lefevre, Gourion, Mesnage stand for many more
of their colleagues. What the manufacturers had in mind was a standardized reactor
concept acceptable to electricity utilities on both sides of the Rhine River, subject to the
same Iicensing conditions, and whose execution would have differed only as a conse-
quence of site conditions.
But they were still miles away from their goal. First, the details of the loop and pool
plans, respectively, of the other partner had to be understood in order for reactor sys-
tems to be harmonized in a later phase. As the Superphenix (SPX) prototype pool plant
had already reached an advanced stage of development, an expert group was estab-
Iished which was to study the design of this reactor in the light of German licensing
criteria. The group proceeded in two steps: First, a German-Belgian-Netherlands
(DeBeNe) group analyzed the details of the SPX design on the basis of French docu-
ments. Then a mixed group was established together with French experts which carried
out an in-depth study, the so-called pool analysis.28 ,29
Finally, both groups found that the pool concept in principle should be capable of being
licensed also in Germany. So-called k.o. points, which would have jeopardized the de-
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sign under German conditions, were not found. All of a sudden, this resulted in the sit-
uation that the pool concept could be seriously considered as a design variant for
SNR 2.30
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In some respects, however, the SPX design would have had to be modified and aug-
mented in order to preclude any risks in the German Iicensing procedure. This applied
especially to the cooling of the reactor top: At this point, the German experts would
have suggested gas instead of
water as the coolant. Also the
handling of major sodium fires
within the reactor dome, with
the afterheat removal li nes de-
stroyed, was discussed critical-
Iy. This was associated with
assumptions made about load
shedding in the course of
crane movements above the
reactor. In the vessel region
the thermohydraulic conditions,
more difficult to fathom than in
pool-type reactors, were a
point of debate, another one
bei ng the complex accident
calculations underlying the assumptions about core meltdown. In addition, problems of
accessibility and maintenance were addressed which, in the view of DeBeNe experts,
were slightly more problematic in pool than in loop-type reactors.
By 1981, the analysis had been concluded with a basically positive vote on the pool
design. In this connection, it emerged that as early as in 1976 the American Bechtel
company had made a similar comparison and found that Superphenix would meet also
most U.S. standards.
1.3 The Government Breeder Memoranda
The association of West European breeder organizations had created a block with
considerable international repercussions. Agreements were concluded with Japan and
PFR Prototype Fast Reactor in Dounreay
(with DFR in the background).
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the USA about specific exchanges of research findings, and existing ties were
strengthened, respectively. Also contacts with the nearest neighbors, the British, be-
came c1oser, albeit only at conferences and similar formal events, for the time being. It
was to take a relatively long time, until 1984, also for Britain to join the European
breeder association at government level. Before addressing that event, we should have
a look at the technical breeder base of the British.
1.3.1 The British Breeder Base
Like France, also the United Kingdom was in a position to start nuclear development
and breeder development immediately after the war. Gas cooled reactors of various de-
signs were the main line of commercial thermal reactors. Fast reactors were the
declared goals of development for the reactor generation to follow.
Dounreay Fast Reactor
Construction of the Dounreay fast Reactor (DfR) was started as early as 1955. The
plant attained its first criticality in 1959, and its full power of 60 MWth four years later.
With its 13.5 MWe tur-
bine it produced 580 mil-
lion kilowatthours of
electricity in nearly fif-
teen years. Even more
important was its use as
an irradiation reactor, es-
pecially by Japanese and
German fast breeder
groups. The income de-
rived from this source
amounted to nearly Ei 0
million.
DFR had NaK as the
coolant; its primary system was made up of 24100ps. Occasionally, e.g. in 1967/68,
leaks occurred in the loops which were difficult to localize. In 1970 there was even a
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sodium fire which burnt for several hours, but had no impact on the environment. The
plant was shut down in 1977 after several end-of-life experiments concerned with stu-
dies of boiling phenomena.
Prototype Fast Reactor
Diagram of the steam generators in PFR.
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Until 1979 the evaporator units, all con-
sisting of the 2 1/4 Cr/1 Mo ferritic type
of steel, worked without major prob-
lems, but then leakages became more
and more frequent. Despite in situ shot
peening of all tube-to-tube plate welds
the failures continued to occur. Conse-
quently, a new method was developed
to deal with them by fitti ng a sleeve to
bypass the weid and thus keep affected
steam tubes in service. Some 3000 sleeves were explosion-welded by 1984. Three-
circuit operation was resumed, and early 1985 the output level of 250 MWe was
achieved for the first time.
The second British fast breeder reactor planned for construction at Dounreay in the
north of Scotland was the Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR). It was designed for an
electric power of 250 MWe, employed the pool principle, and was planned, commis-
sioned and, later on, also operated by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
(UKAEA). Construction of PFR, which was begun in 1966, suffered considerable delays
after lamellar tearing had been observed in the steel used for the reactor top shield,
which required this component practically to be remade from scratch. After first critical-
ity in March 1976, a number of sodium-water leaks occurred in the three steam genera-
tors, mainly in the evaporator. The af-
fected pipes were closed by explosive
plugging; in July 1976 all three circuits
were in operation for the first time, and
in the following year the plant was oper-
ated at an electric power of 200 MWe.
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Between 1982 and 1986 considerable problems were encountered with the PFR air
heat exchangers on the decay heat rejection loops, although little or no generation was
lost. Gas locking and pipe blocking led to uneven tube temperatures and subsequent
low cycle fatigue failures at the pulied tees where the tubes joined the headers. The
situation was managed by damage accountancy and finally resolved by replacing all
three units with an improved design.
Except for the steam generators and the air heat exchangers, the other components of
PFR worked relatively troublefree. This also applies to the sodium loops where, in con-
trast to the French Phenix, no defects occurred in the intermediate heat exchangers. It
is also true of the primary sodium pumps which, by 1985, had already been operated
for 200,000 hours without any defect. Also the fuel elements developed an excellent
operating record. Although they had been designed only to a burnup of 7.5 %, they al-
lowed irradiation to more than 10%, with only a handful of cladding defects arising.31 ,32
Commercial Demonstration Fast Reactor
Planning for a large breeder beyond the 1000 MWe mark, the Commercial Fast Reac-
tor 1 (CFR 1), was begun in Britain already in the early seventies. The designation,
CFR 1, was to indicate that it was to be the first reactor of aseries. Roughly around
1975/76, planning activities came to a halt mainly for two reasons: On the one hand,
the problems encountered in construction and commissioning of the preceding PFR
had aroused public attention. On the other hand, there had been voices within the
Government against switching to breeder technology too quickly. These concerns were
articulated especially by Energy Secretary Wedgwood Benn who, after all, was able to
quote findings by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. The Chairman of
that Commission, Sir Brian Flowers, advocated a policy of not enforcing the expansion
of large breeders, for reasons of radiation protection, and temporarily shelving CFR 1.
In September 1981, a new large breeder design, the so-called Commercial Demon-
stration Fast Reactor (CDFR), was presented which had been planned by the Na-
tional Nuclear Corporation (NNC) together with UKAEA to specifications set by the
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). The technical documents were submitted
together with a cost calculation showing that the capital cost of the 1300 MWe plant
would be some 20% above those of the advanced gas cooled reactor power stations of
Heysham Band Torness, whose construction had just been started.33
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SUPERPHENI X-1
Comparison of the sizes of the CDFR and SuperpMnix 1
breeder power plants.
CDFR (1981)
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CDFR had been designed as a very compact plant in order to save materials costs. Its
vessel, with a diameter of 19 m, was approximately 2 m smaller than that of
Superphemix; the sodium inventory was 3000 t (3500 t in SPX). The main components,
such as pumps and intermediate heat exchangers, were just as compact. A special ef-
fort had been made to keep the pipes of the secondary system short. The steam gener-
ator concept was
kept open, bearing
in mind the un-
solved problems in
PFR. The systems
shortlisted included
once-through boil-
ers with straight
tubes and J-tube
bundles. A set of
eight steam gener-
ator modules for
the four-train plant
was assumed. In
engineered safeguards, the integrity of the vessel had been given top priority, in line
with traditional British reactor design. The core support system included the diagrid,
which transmitted the core weight into the primary vessel and, hence, into the reactor
top. Provision was also made for easy access in case detailed examinations were nec-
essary.34,35
1.3.2 The UK on Its Way to Europe
When CDFR was presented publicly by the then UKAEA Chairman, Walter MarshalI, in
1981, the press called it a "portfolio for fast reactor collaboration."36 Indeed, the eight
volumes making up the design basis report impressively testify to the status of British
breeder technology. In addition, there was a comprehensive R&D program focusing on
aspects of materials development, instrumentation, and safety. Even for the ailing PFR
a remedy seemed to have been found.
It therefore came as no surprise that many contacts on both sides of the Channel were
sought and established between 1980 and 1983. The R&D organizations paved the
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way. Hans-Henning Hennies, Executive Board member of KfK, in agreement with his
colleagues at the Comite de Liaison, invited his opposite number, UKAEA Director
Jack Moore, and explained to him the basic principles of the German-French Breeder
Research Program in the relaxed atmosphere of a walk in the Black Forest. On the side
of industry, exchanges of experience were initiated among NNC, Novatome, and
Interatom; at this point the Germans remembered that, ten years before, they had been
about to establish a link between KWU and The Nuclear Power Group (TNPG).
The European fast breeder program in the early eighties.
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These talks, which could not yet be called negotiations, of course proved to be most
difficult among the industrial partners, the electricity utilities, and SERENA. They re-
volved around
the question of a
common breeder
design; the Brit-
ish sought a
merger of their
design with that
of the West Euro-
peans; simply ac-
cepting Super-
phenix 1, or Su-
perphenix 2 al-
ready in planning, was not in their interest. On the part of SERENA, the question of an
"admission fee" to be charged to the British played a role; the press published rumors
of amounts on the order of E50 million.
As the talks became more specific, special task forces were set up to look into the
problems and possibilities resulting from broader international cooperation. ARGO was
one such task force combining high-level representatives of the manufacturing indus-
tries and research organizations in France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands to investigate practical methods for the deployment of fast breeders in Europe
under its Chairman, Georges Vendryes. Incidentally, ARGO was not an acronym, but a
reference to Greek mythology, to Jason and the Argonauts looking for the Golden
Fleece, in this case the European breeder project. On the side of the electricity utilities,
the European Fast Reactor Utilities Group (EFRUG) was constituted at approximately
the same time with utilities from the countries mentioned above and already including
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Britain. Almost unnoticed, EFRUG later was to become the central partner in European
breeder cooperation.
On September 5, 1983, the day had come: Peter Walker, British Secretary of State for
Energy, announced that his country wanted to cooperate with the West Europeans in
breeder development and would immediately begin negotiations to this effect. Obvious-
Iy, also c10ser ties with Japan and the USA had been considered, but at that time Japan
had not yet embarked on building its MONJU breeder of comparable size, and the
American breeder program was difficult to fathom after the recent discontinuation of the
Clinch River Project. As far as timing was concerned, the European programs seemed
to tally best. Also the fact that the French, Iike the British, had adopted the pool con-
cept, may have played a role in the British decision in favor of joining the Continent.
The UK was on its way to Europe.
1.3.3 The Government Memoranda Are Signed
Now the lawyers had a hard time drafting the relatively complex system of agreements.
Of course, the interests of the governments had to be taken into account, but so had
those of industry and of the research organizations. The whole package included the
following agreements:
(1) In a Memorandum of Understanding the governments intended to declare their
wish for long-term cooperation in the breeder field.
(2) The R&D and industrial partners in the respective countries were to be invited to
draw up another memorandum of understanding with the objective of concen-
trating all efforts on the introduction of commercial breeder reactors.
(3) In a final, but important, step, specific agreements were to be signed in the
R&D field, on industrial cooperation, on the proteetion of know-how and on li-
censing and, in this way, cooperation proper was to be started.
In addition, agreements were planned in the sector of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the
electricity utilities were called upon to exchange holdings in future breeder power
plants.37
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Shortly before the planned signing date of the Government Memoranda mentioned un-
der (1) above the partners on the Continent became worried when the UK announced
that it would reduce by 30 percent its R&D breeder budget of currently ~150 million.38
Inquiries soon revealed that half of this reduction was to be compensated by higher
sales of electricity from the PFR, while the other half was already considered a rational-
ization effect derived from future cooperation. Interestingly enough, the British Gov-
ernment ordered a similar budget cut again before the agreements listed under item (2)
above were signed by Secretary Parkinson in 1988; a third, very drastic, slashing of
funds by the British in the autumn of 1992 (prior to the conclusion of EFR Phase 3) fi-
nally brought the end of British participation in the EFR Project.
On January 10,1984, the German Federal Minister for Research and Technology,
Heinz Riesenhuber, invited his colleagues to Bonn for the signing ceremony of the
Government Memoranda. The top-level group included the French Minister for Industry
and Research, Laurent Fabius; the Belgian Minister for Industry, Etienne Knoops; the
Italian Ambassador, Walter Guardini; and the British Secretary of State for Energy,
Peter Walker. The Netherlands were granted an option to join this umbrella agreement
at a later point in time (which option they renounced formally in 1987).
The ticklish matter of the entrance fee had been settled in advance. It was agreed that
the British contributed on an equitable basis primarily in kind rather than in cash. This
was to be achieved in part by providing reprocessing capacity for fuel elements with
high burnups, for which an excellent facility was available at Dounreay.
Several partners, especially Fabius, emphasized that Europe did not want to turn into a
closed shop by signing this agreement, but that also other countries, especially Japan
and the USA, were free to join. In addition, the detailed agreements were expected to
be signed by the R&D and industrial organizations towards the end of the current
year, 1984.
This assumption soon was to prove overly optimistic.
In actual fact, it took until 1989 for this step to be taken.
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2 A Thorny Path 10 the Common Model Breeder
In 1973 - 1984, provisional agreement had been reached on a German-French breeder
construction program (Superphenix 1/SNR 2), but how the British were to be integrated
was not yet clear. One of the open points was the way in which the UK was to become
actively engaged in these two projects. Other interests, not yet specified, arose later, as
will be shown in this chapter.
2.1 A Stop Sign to European Cooperation
2.1.1 An Auspicious Beginning
Nearly two months after the Government Memoranda had been signed, the envisaged
Memorandum of the industrial and the research organizations was signed in London on
March 2, 1984. Negotiations about the 22-page document proceeded smoothly, and the
Memorandum bore the signatures of the thirteen leading personalities in the five coun-
tries concerned. The purpose was to pool the existing resources for the construction of
commercial breeder reactors. A staggered program of construction was to be set up
under which the countries, one by one, were to build a reactor (and a group of reactors,
respectively) or contribute some other important part of the program. As more and more
improvements were being made, one commercial type would emerge which would be
licensable in all countries as the European Breeder.39
The Memorandum contains several references to the definition of the construction pro-
gram being a responsibility of the electricity utilities. Thus, Article 16 of the Memoran-
dum suggests that the next breeder of more than 1000 MWe (meaning Superphenix 2)
probably was going to be built in France, while an agreement about financing the fol-
lowing breeder, to be constructed in Germany (meaning SNR 2), existed within the
framework of the Utilities' Convention. Two other Memoranda about fuel fabrication re-
processing were signed only between the French-British organizations, Cogema, Brit-
ish Nuclear Fuels Ud. (BNFL), CEA, and UKAEA.
Sir Peter Hirsch, Chairman of UKAEA which hosted the event, also pointed out that a
licensing company comparable to Serena was being established in Britain. In fact, Fast
Reactor Technology Ud., or Fastec for short, was founded towards the end of the year
38
as a joint venture of NNC (60% of the interest) and UKAEA (40%). Fastec and the
slightly older Serena were charged with collecting and exploiting for commercial use all
breeder know-how.
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Even betore the detailed contracts
were signed, the British were invited
to join all management groups in the
R&D sector.40 ,41 As of 1984, the
former Comite de Liaison (CdL) had
become a Steering Committee (SC)
into which the UK was allowed to
delegate three members and one
observer. Also the Working Groups,
now called AGT, were open to the
British experts; in fact, two groups
were enlarged to make better use of
the special experience accumulated
by the new members in instrumentation (AGT 2B) and structural integrity (AGT 9B).
The Group of Liaison Agents was to keep the Steering Committee abreast of the needs
of industrial reactor designers.42 ,43
The organization in the R&D sector had become relatively complex after the British had
joined. Breeder-related research was conducted by thirteen organizations on twenty dif-
ferent locations in five (Iater six)
countries. The manpower totaled
2600 scientists and engineers, and
the annual budget amounted to the
equivalent of US $235 million.
An emerging new subgroup of the Steering Committee was the so-called Management
Subcommittee (MSC). It met approximately every month or every other month, ex-
amined the progress made by the Working Groups, and reported to the Steering
Committee which met twice a year. Dave Evans, UKAEA, was the committed Chairman
of this body.
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2.1.2 The Franco-German Breeder Spat
1984 was a busy year, with many meetings of the R&D organizations to flesh out the
detailed agreement to be signed. The fields of work had to be defined, duplications as
weil as gaps had to be avoided. Finding the correct wording in the agreements was en-
trusted to Jeff Welch (UKAEA) as a native English speaker, English being the
"project language" the other West Europeans used as best they could. In November
1984, the detailed R&D Agreement was initialed by all partners. After conclusion of the
industrial and licensing agreements, all documents could have been signed. The
signing ceremony had been planned at Aachen, the imperial palace of Charlemagne, a
symbolic venue for Germans and French alike, on July 3, 1985. Invitations had been
sent out, when the German Undersecretary in the Ministry for Research and Technolo-
gy, Hans-Hilger Haunschild, called the event off at very short notice.44
What had happened?
Undersecretary Haunschild had not failed to notice that the research organizations had
agreed about the division of their labor, whereas the electricity utilities still seemed to
wrestle with a number of problems. In particular, the utilities had not yet agreed on the
reactor construction program and the shares to be granted each other. EFRUG had
spent more than a year debating these questions, but in vain. Essentially, it boiled
down to a dissent between the German RWE and the French EdF which prevented the
industrial and Iicensing agreements from being signed. The main arguments proposed
by the French and German sides, respectively, at that time will be briefly Iisted below
(without comments).
EdF argued that the Utilities' Convention of 1973 was no longer in keeping with the
times, and should be renegotiated for various reasons. On the one hand, there was the
entry of the British, which had added a further dimension to European cooperation. On
the other hand, the considerable delay suffered by SNR 300 had shifted the entire pro-
gram, because the design of Superphenix 2, the French project after Superphenix 1,
meanwhile had advanced much further than that of SNR 2. Moreover, the French had
grave doubts whether ESK would succeed, in view of the nuclear opposition in Ger-
many, in finding a German site for SNR 2.
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RWE insisted on the conventions signed 1973 to be kept to the letter, for, the reason-
ing went, they were not affected in any way by the accession of the British. In accor-
dance with the Con-
vention, commlSSlon-
ing of Superphenix 1
1had to be followed by I I
SNR2
the construction of
SNR 2. For the current
planning phase of this
power plant, the 16%
partner, EdF, was re-
quested to pay the
amount of DM 24 mil-
lion.
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EdF refused to pay Timetables of the SNR 2, SNR 300, and Superphenix 1
and, in turn, proposed fast breeder plants (state as of 1985).
to establish a Europe-
an vendors' consortium, "European Breeder Industry," with British participation and in
analogy with the Airbus Consortium. This suggestion was refused by RWE.
After the utilities had run out of arguments, the politicians were called in. An exchange
of correspondence took place between President Mitterand and Federal Chancel-
lor Kohl, and at one of their regular meetings in late 1985 the matter was brought on
the agenda. The Heads of Government commissioned Renon, then Head of CEA, and
Haunschild, BMFT, to solve the problem together with EdF (Guilhamon) and RWE
(Spalthoff).
However, both sides stuck to their points of view. RWE demanded that the Utilities'
Convention be followed, and EdF in turn expected ironclad assurances that SNR 2
would be built on a German site without any politically motivated delays. Obviously, a
competition was on between SNR 2 and Superphenix 2. Despite all efforts , no agree-
ment was reached between RWE and EdF by summer 1986. Then the election cam-
paign for the German Federal Parliament began in Germany, and the subject was feit to
be out of bounds for that period of time. 45
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In the following years, 1987/88, the SNR 2/SPX 2 controversy receded into the back-
ground as the political and technical problems associated with SNR 300 and Super-
phenix 1 emerged. However, first the progress achieved in the design of Superphenix 2
and SNR 2 should be outlined.
2.2 Progress in Breeder Design
For aperiod of approximately ten years, between 1977 and 1987, France was engaged
in the design of Superphenix 2 (SPX 2), Germany in that of SNR 2. In Britain, however,
design work on CDFR to all intents and purposes was terminated after the report had
been submitted in 1981. The Government and CEGB, for the time being, wished the
project not to be implemented in their country, but emphasized their participation in
SNR 2 or SPX 2 or both. The European breeder agreements had paved the way for this
solution.
At the same time, the UK indicated a clear interest in building a medium-sized repro-
cessing plant in Dounreay. It was to be based on the technology of a small plant ex-
isting on the same location, wh ich had proved to be particularly valuable in reproces-
sing high-burnup MOX fuel rods for PFR. BNFL and UKAEA estimated the cost of such
a facility at approximately US $300 million, assuming that the plant could be available
for the first of the three planned demonstration breeders by the mid-nineties. It was de-
signed for an annual throughput of 60 - 80 t of heavy metal and was to be called Euro-
pean Demonstration Reprocessing Plant (EDRP). A laboratory for specific problems of
reprocessing fast breeder fuel was dedicated in Dounreay in 1985 (Marshall Laborato-
ry).
The plans for EDRP, as for the French Mar 600 and PURR plants, respectively, were
given up later, when the deadlines for the demonstration breeder began to slip. Any
bottlenecks arising in reprocessing were to be met by blending MOX fuel with LWR fuel
in existing reprocessing plants for thermal fue!.
2.2.1 The Superphenix 2 Design
Roughly from the start of construction of Superphenix 1 (1977), France increasingly
began to work on the design of the follow-on project, Superphenix 2. The prime con-
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tractor and author of the conventional plant studies (BOP) was EdF, while the design of
the nuclear steam supply system was in the hands of Novatome; CEA contributed major
parts of the R&D program. The primary goal c1early was to cut the costs of SPX 2 on
the basis of the design for SPX 1. To this end, even plans of twin or multiple plants
were considered temporarily.
Thus, Novatome was comrnis-
sioned by EdF in 1979 to sub-
mit a provisional bid for two
and six fast breeders, respec-
tively, of 1500 MWe each, for
which the name "Sa6ne Re-
actors" had already been
found. In the end, however,
plans were drafted for only·
one reactor. Its name, Super-
phenix 2, was changed into
Reacteur aNeutrons Rapides
(RNR 1500) roughly in 1986,
referring to the plant's 1500
MWe power.46 ,47
Also the one-off SPX 2/RNR 1500 plant was designed mainly with cost reductions in
mind. One step in this direction was the power raise from 1200 to 1500 MWe at
practically the same reactor size as in SPX 1. In addition, standards of the N4 pressur-
ized water reactor line were to be incorporated in the turbine sector. Other factors later
contributing to cost minimization were the deletion of the external fuel element store,
the simplification of secondary fuel handling, and the reduction of the breeding ratio.
The technical design of RNR 1500 provided for a prismatic reactor building. The reac-
tor block housed a two-zone core; it was characterized by a single-walled inner vessel
with a self-supporting "redan" and a warm air cooled roof slab. The safety vessel was
anchored in the vessel pit concrete. The above-core structure basically consisted of a
thick top plate and a cylindrical supporting shell. The main vessel and the roof slab
were inspectable in service.
The primary sodiurn circuit was, of course, of the pool type, which allows containment
of all the active sodium in one single vessel. The intermediate sodium circuit consisted
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of four independent loops each featuring a mechanical pump, two intermediate heat ex-
changers, and a REGAIN-type steam generator. The single-module helical-tube steam
generators with a unit thermal power of 900 MWth were installed outside the con-
tainment.
Decay heat removal was achieved by a
set of four independent loops filled with
non-radioactive sodium. These loops
extracted heat through a set of four
diversified sodium/sodium heat ex-
changers plunging into the reactor hot
pool and discharging this heat to the
atmosphere via sodium/air exchangers.
There were a number of major differ-
ences in the technical designs of SPX 1
and SPX 2. One of the most striking ex-
amples certainly was the abolition of
the dome above the reactor in the
RNR 1500.
Sleam
generalOr---
-Coklll3P
Outline diagram 01 a REGAIN loop.
In November 1983 the Conceptual De-
sign Report was documented; in paral-
lel, the FBR-specific Design and Con-
struction Rules (RCC) were prepared. Later on, the RNR 1500 praject received a posi-
tive recommendation fram the "Graupe Permanent de SOrete des Reacteurs."
In addition to the SPX 2 studies a comprehensive review of the main FBR options was
undertaken in France during 1982 - 1983. A team of about 20 experts, led by CEA
(Sauvage) and named ECRA (Equipe de Conception des Reacteurs Avances), was set
up in Cadarache with representatives from EdF and Framatome/Novatome. ECRA was
to prapose more economical alternative solutions for future reactors; the conclusions of
these studies48 ,49 were later used in the EFR project.
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2.2.2 The SNR 2 Design
It will be recalled that ESK had commissioned the INB vendors' consortium to plan the
large SNR 2 pool-type breeder in 1976. In 1978 - 1981, the so-called pool analysis was
conducted tagether with Novatome-NIRA. On the basis of that analysis, the INB/KWU
consortium was awarded another contract in 1982 for preplanning a 1500 MWe pool-
type reactor. The French experience in planning SPX 2 was to be fully utilized in that
draft.
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structure
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Core
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Core support
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Cross section, SNR 2 primary system.
Large rotating plug
Cold
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Fuel
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The design of the pool-type SNR 2 was nearly completed in 1985. The primary system
consisted of a main vessel and aseparate guard vessel suspended fram the top, a
double-walled "redan," eight intermediate heat exchangers (IHX), and four primary
pumps. For the secondary system, the SPX 2 "REGAIN" concept with straight-tube
steam generators was
adopted. In order to im-
prave the avai labiIity of
the plant, eight second-
ary systems were pra-
vided so that each IHX
was directly connected to
a secondary pump and a
steam generator. The de-
cay heat removal system
consisted ot tour im-
mersed coolers wh ich
transferred the heat to
four air coolers arranged
in separate natural-draft
chimneys.
Compared to SPX 2, SNR 2 had no internal or external core catcher, had smaller steam
generator modules (450 MWth), an external fuel element store, and a cylindrical reac-
tor building. The nuclear steam supply system was designed so that full-Ioad operation
was possible with seven out of eight steam generators.
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Compared with SNR 300, a major reduction in specific plant costs was sought in a num-
ber of important ways. Thus, hypothetical core disruptive accidents were to be excluded
by preventive measures. Decay heat was to be removed exclusively by passive sys-
tems making use of the advantageous thermal properties of sodium. The design ap-
proach was based on realistic assumptions about pipe leakages and acceptance of the
leak-before-break criterion. Finally, the probability of occurrence of less frequent exter-
nal impact events, such as airplane crash or gas cloud explosion, was to be taken into
account in the load criteria to be established. The German Federal Ministry of the Inte-
rior (BMI) established an advisory group to settle these important basic questions. To-
gether with members of the German Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (RSK)
it approved the SNR 2 safety concept. This provided an important backing to further
planning activities.50
After completion of the planning stage, ESK and INB jointly found that there were no
grave technical, safeguards or cost differences between the loop and pool designs.
RWE c1early favored the pool version of the SNR 2 for the following reasons:51
(1) There was already a large breeder plant, SPX 1, which, in addition, had been built
in international cooperation.
(2) Considerable additional funds would have to be spent to raise the loop type to the
level of technical maturity already attained by the pool type.
(3) The further development and harmonization of only one type in Europe implied
cost benefits to all partners.
(4) The anticipated operating performance of SPX 1 was more valuable for a follow-
ing pool-type than for a loop-type plant.
It then became apparent that the two projects, SNR 2 and SPX 2, were in a competitive
situation. Both EdF and Novatome tried to find international partners to finance SPX 2
and, in this way, protect the continuity of French fast breeder development. At one point
in time, the British CEGB was mentioned. RWE, on the other hand, tried to build the
pool version of SNR 2 in accordance with the Utilities' Convention of 1973 as the next
breeder to be constructed by ESK.52
However, these schemes were counteracted by the severe problems soon experienced
in construction and operation of the SN R 300 and SPX 1 plants.
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2.3 Problems in Breeder Operation
In the mid-eighties, the leading German and French projects, SNR 300 and Super-
phenix 1, experienced considerable political and technical troubles described in greater
detail in this chapter. However, let us first have a look at the smaller plants, Phenix,
PFR, and KNK 11, whose reactor operation at the same period of time was free from
major problems and resulted in satisfactory availabilities.53 ,54
Phenix had a load factor of 50 to 77% in 1980 - 1988. With one exception (1982), the
plant was connected to the power grid for more than 200 full-Ioad days annually. In
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1982/83, leaks in the reheater modules led to aperiod of operation on two circuits. The
failures were located at the welds of the upper bend of these components. In 1986, a
small leak developed in one of the IHX, which was replaced by aspare component.
Finally, in 1986, a leak occurred in one of the main pipes of the secondary circuit,
allowing some 50 kg of sodium to freeze in the insulation.
PFR in Dounreay for the first time attained its rated power of 250 MWe in March 1985,
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after sleeving of the evaporator tubes to bypass the troublesome tube/tube plate
welding had been completed in summer 1984. The load factors in 1986 - 1989 aver-
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aged 40%; 1989 even 51.8% was reached. Some problems still arose in superheater
unit 2 which, from 1987 on, was replaced by new equipment together with the re-
maining original reheaters.
In KNK 11, the 20 MWe test facility at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, the rated
load had been reached in March 1979 for the first time after the modification. In sum-
mer 1982, the MOX fuel elements attained a burnup of 100,000 MWd/t, which was 40%
above the design specifications. As a consequence of argon gas passing through the
core, a number of unplanned outages had been experienced during this period of op-
eration; the defect was corrected by modifications to the plant. In 1983, the second
core of KNK 11, with thicker fuel rods, was commissioned. Also this core attained in-pile
times far beyond the original design limits.
2.3.1 SNR 300: Technical Progress and Political Trouble
When the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition government came into office in Octo··
ber 1982, the German SNR 300 breeder project experienced a remarkable revival. Par-
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Iiament approved the continuation of the Kalkar project and its later commissioning; as
a consequence, building activities were resumed.
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Construction now proceeded at a breathtaking pace. The reactor vessel, which had
been kept in cold storage on the power plant site since 1976, was moved into its final
position in the reactor cavity still in late 1982. Between 1983 and 1985, the 33 large
components, especially the sodium pumps, intermediate heat exchangers, and steam
generators, most of which had been manufactured in the Netherlands, were transported
to the plant and assembled. Also fuel element fabrication at Alkem and Belgonucleaire
had been completed in 1985. At peak periods, up to 3300 persons were engaged in
assembly work at Kalkar; 900 firms, most of them small and medium-sized enterprises
from the Federal Republic and from Belgium and the Netherlands, participated in the
development effort. Cooperation among planning engineers, assembly crews, and su-
pervisory and licensing authorities was so successful that the timetable of the project
was underrun by no less than seven months on a few occasions - an unprecedented
event in the history of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station.
In May 1985, after sodium had been filled into the primary systems, construction of the
breeder plant as specified in the delivery contract was completed. The subsequent
prenuclear commissioning phase produced no major problems. Some problems, how-
ever, were encountered with leaking storage tanks, a broken vibration lance, and
moisture in the top shield. An operating permit for fuel loading and for the critical
experiment had been applied for a long time ago. However, it did not materialize. In
fact, it never materialized.
What had happened?
The State of North Rhine-Westphalia, the coal eountry in whieh Kalkar was situated,
had meanwhile embarked on a so-called "coal first policy," wh ich had been coupled
with a halt of eonstruetion of all nuclear power plants. When the Social Demoeratie
Party won the 1985 eleetions to the State Parliament with an absolute majority, leading
representatives of the State SPD expressed themselves even against eommissioning
SNR 300. A change of mind in the whole party was brought about by the Chernobyl
aecident in April 1986. That disaster traumatized large parts of the German publie for
months and, in partieular, reunited the nuclear opposition. Consequently, the Social
Demoeratic Party of Germany at its party eongress in Nuremberg in August 1986 decid-
ed to opt out of nuclear power altogether within the next ten years. Many delegates ex-
pressed themselves especially against the breeder in Kalkar, believing it to have a pilot
function in introducing the dreaded plutonium technology. Attempts were even made to
establish eertain technical paralleis between the reactors of Chernobyl and Kalkar:
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Both reactors contained burnable components (graphite and sodium, respectively), and
had positive coefficients of reactivity under certain operating conditions.
After Chernobyl, no progress was made in the licensing procedure for SNR 300. The
plant was ready, but could not be commissioned. Nonetheless, great efforts were made
to refute those arguments of the State authorities which were of a technical, not political
and ideological, nature. Especially the alleged similarities in the technical concepts of
Kalkar and Chernobyl were convincingly explained away by Interatom. The German
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards confirmed these findings by the manufac-
turers in a detailed comment in April 1987. Following an instruction by the Federal Min-
ister for the Environment, Klaus Töpfer, an illustrious group of independent interna-
tional safety experts from France, the UK, Japan, and USA dealt with the same ques-
tion six months later, and arrived at the same positive finding about Kalkar. All experts
agreed that the mechanical energy release in a Bethe-Tait accident would not destroy
the primary system of SNR 300.
Nevertheless, the competent State Minister in Düsseldorf (Jochimsen) continued to re-
fuse the operating permit for the SNR 300.
2.3.2 Technical Problems in Superphenix 1
Ordered by NERSA, the construction of Superphenix started in 1976 and initially pro-
gressed quite speedily. However, the first trouble was encountered in the early
eighties. The problems caused by the crane system have already been referred to. In
addition, there were difficulties in manufacturing the reactor roof slab, which weighed
3000 tons, and whose twelve modules were made partly in France and partly in Italy.
Also production of the steam generators caused a delay in the timetable. The complex
systems of helically wound tubes were difficult to weid, and quality control of the welds
and of the thermohydraulic features was relatively expensive, compared to the condi-
tions in U-shaped steam generators for pressurized reactors.
From October 1984 onward, sodium was filled into the plant. In the prenuclear tests,
the engineers registered clearly audible flow-induced vibration noises wh ich exeeded
the calculated values and seemed to come from structures within the vessel.55 The MIR
robot developed for inspection of the main vessel welds was used to ascertain the
source of the noise. It fell into the gap between the reactor vessel and the safety vessel
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Core cover plug lattice of
SuperphElnix during construction.
Core loading was begun on June 20, 1985,
and Superphenix went critical for the first
time in the early afternoon of Saturday,
September 7, 1985. Accidentally - quelle
surprise! - this occurred on the 65th
birthday of Georges Vendryes who, of
course, happened to be present. After
many years of activity as director and men-
tor of the French breeder program he then
retired. The reactor went critical with 325 fuel elements; previous calculations had in-
dicated 326 - a veritable success of the French reactor physicists.
when manipulated and had to be recovered
with difficulty. Finally, the phenomenon was
traced back to cold sodium flowing from a
special spillway into the inner vessel of the
reactor. Changes in the shape of some
twenty reflector elements improved the
thermohydraulic conditions and solved the
vibration problem.
Afterwards, NERSA (Saitcevsky) and EdF (Carle) presented a few cost data at a press
conference. Their report showed that technical problems in construction and the asso-
ciated delays - the plant originally was to have been commissioned in 1982 - had
caused considerable extra cost. The total cost of the project ran up to some FF 25 bil-
lion, which made Superphenix, on the basis of cost per unit power installed, approxi-
mately a factor of 2.3 more expensive than the 1300 MWe LWR plants, Paluel-1 and
-2, built at the same time. 56
In the following months, the power of Superphenix was raised in steps. In January
1986, the plant was connected to the power grid for the first time, and attained its full
power in December of that year. Because of the high thermal inertia of the nuclear
steam supply system, the plant was quite stable and easy to contro!.
A certain amount of difficulties arose from the large number of reactor scrams (74)
during the power raise. As a rule, they were due to defects in instrumentation and in the
many valves of the plant, but also to human error. In February 1987, one accident was
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Storage drum of Superphenix before
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By that time the plant had been in operation
for some 4000 hours and produced a total of
2 terawatthours of electricity, when a serious
defect occurred on March 8, 1987. Leak de-
tectors between the spent fuel storage ves-
sei made of ferritic steel and the safety ves-
sei enclosing it raised an alarm. Immediate
measurements seemed to indicate a leakage
of sodium into the gap between the two
vessels at a rate of approximately 20 I per
hour. This suspicion was confirmed, and
roughly one month later already 25 m3 of
sodium had spilled into the gap between the
two vessels. As it was found impossible to repair the storage vessel at short notice, a
decision was taken to reload into the core the few fuel elements held in the storage
vessel, and put the approximately 400 dum-
my elements into special containers. Subse-
quent materials studies indicated that
cracking very probably had been due to em- Storage
brittlement by hydrogen; the cracks obvious- drumvessel
Iy developed disruptive zones under the in-
fluence of the residual welding stress.58
Leak loeationThe accident happened at a most adverse
point in time. The temporary operating li-
cense was about to expire, and the regula- Superphenix fuel storage drum leak location.
tory authority, Service Central de SOrete
des Installations Nucleaires (SCSIN), intimated difficulties in extending it. In addition, it
so happened that Novatome was to be taken over as a division of Framatome, also in
the summer of 1987. In view of unsettled warranty claims against Novatome - after all,
Superphenix had not yet been delivered to NERSA -, negotiations about the merger un-
derstandably became more complicated.
caused by a so-called water hammer. When turbine B was commissioned, steam got
into an unpurged pipe full of water and caused a rather severe shock to the adjacent
components.57
Interatom truck advertising photovoltaics
(with Superphemix in the background).
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The sodium leak in Superphenix threw the French media into high gear. On June 28,
the then Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, joined the public debate and commissioned
the competent Minister for Industry, Alain Madelin, to conduct a detailed study of the
situation. The Minister soon ordered an inspection to be made of the reactor vessel and
the safety vessel, and other quality control measures to be taken.
In the light of this situation it was deemed unlikely that the plant would be restarted at
short notice.
2.4 The Utilities Clear the Way
The persistent hesitation of the European electricity utilities to agree on a common
breeder program began to have a clearly negative impact on various partners after
1987. The decision taken by the
Netherlands not to join the breed-
er agreement has already been
mentioned. Also the Belgians
decided at that time to reduce the
nuclear share of their CEN/SCK
Mol Research Center and lay off
several hundred staff members.
At the Karlsruhe Nuclear Re-
search Center, diversification be-
gan into such new areas as nu-
c1ear fusion, climatological re-
search, and microstructure engi-
neering, and the share of breeder
research was cut back from 30% to 15%. Even Interatom ventured into new areas, such
as solar technology (in addition to catalytic converters, artificial intelligence) and plan-
ned to eliminate 400 professional fast breeder jobs by 1990.
As a result of the dragging negotiations with EdF about Superphenix 2, also Novatome
got into an increasingly more difficult situation. In Italy, the outcome of the nuclear
referenda had resulted in ENEA ceasing to be available as a partner in the R&D sector;
the only hope remaining was that ENEL would continue to be a member of the Super-
phenix consortium. In Britain, the Government planned to privatize CEGB, thereby
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creating a difficult situation in the breeder field. And changes became imminent even in
France: In 1988, EdF for the first time planned no new nuclear power plant.
2.4.1 EFRUG Decides on the Common Model Breeder
In mid-1987, after the German national elections, EFRUG resumed its exploratory talks.
The problems encountered in the SNR 300 and Superphenix reactors, and the gradual
erosion among the R&D partners, required quick decisions unless European breeder
cooperation was to come apart. In particular, conditions had to be created to make the
breeder agreements, which had been shelved since 1984, ready for signature at lang
last. This primarily required agreement among the utilities on a European breeder con-
struction program.
At a meeting of EFRUG with RWE in Essen in June 1987 finally the ice was broken,s9
In a very frank discussion the partners confessed that, under the present conditions,
there was no way to build either Superphenix 2 or SNR 2. Consequently, they decided
to get out of this stalemate by concentrating all forces on one common reactor. This
Common Model Breeder, initially called EURO 1, was to combine the best design
principles of SPX 2, SNR 2, and CDFR, to be designed jointly by all vendors, and to be
based on the R&D findings of all research organizations. In addition, EFRUG de-
manded that EURO 1 be Iicensable in all partner countries. In the course of further
discussions held by EFRUG in Lyons and London in late 1987, cooperation of the R&D
partners was obtained, and a preliminary structure of project development was drafted.
In a planning phase of five years, the basic concept was to be established in the first
two years, and the detailed design draft was to be elaborated in the following three
years. 60
At a meeting at Interatom in Bensberg in February 1988, these loose agreements were
formalized. EFRUG and represen-
tatives of the vendors and the re-
search organizations agreed on a
common approach to the project
and resolved to adapt accordingly
the wording of the agreements ConlributionsbyANSandBN
still to be signed. The breeder Distribution 01 EFR engineering among
power plant was to be designed the partners in EFR Associates.
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by NNC, Novatome, and Interatom; certain contributions were expected from Belgo-
nucleaire, Neratoom, and Ansaldo. Interatom could hope to be entrusted with the
leadership in the field of passive decay heat removal, which was so important to
technical safety, and for which Ulrich Wolft of RWE, among others, had argued so com-
mittedly. Precisely at the time of the meeting, Matthias Koehler, Vice President of the
company, was able to announce that funds for the ILONA experimental facility had
been made available. ILONA was to demonstrate the passive decay heat removal of a
large breeder reactor.
Vet another decision was taken: The common breeder project was given its new, final
name.
EURO 1 became EFR: European Fast Reactor.
2.4.2 The European Agreements Are Signed
The legal step was delayed again, until 1989, as a re-
sult of considerable irritation caused by the British
camp. The British Energy Secretary, Cecil Parkinson,
had told his Parliament on July 21, 1988 that the Gov-
emment was planning major cutbacks in the breeder
field. For instance, it intended to decommission the
Dounreay PFR in five years and shut down the asso-
ciated reprocessing plant three years later. Decisive
cutbacks were planned also in the R&D program. The
present annual budget of E54 million was to be re-
duced to 20 next year and even to Ei 0 million in the
USA
186
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USA
Total: $186 million
,-------'"
~eTherliüids~:or;
Fed. Rep.
Germany
52.5
BelQium 7.5
United
Kingdom
72.0
France
63.4
Italy
34.7
W. Europe
Tolal: $ 235 million
Breeder R&D bUdgets in
Western Europe and USA in 1985
(excluding expenditures for
reactor operation).
Now that the electricity utilities had agreed on the technology of a future building pro-
gram it was possible, at long last, to think about
signing the detailed breeder agreements initialed back
in 1984 and since waiting to be adopted. The signing
ceremony was to be held in Germany by invitation of
Minister for Research Heinz Riesenhuber. This time,
the venue was not to be symbolic Aachen, but the
more mundane Bonn.
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following years. This was coupled with major job losses in various British research
centers,61
This decision by the UK Secretary for Energy jeopardized the European breeder pro-
gram most seriously before it had even taken off. While France, Germany, and the Brit-
ish originally had each contributed one third to the overall budget, the UK, as a conse-
quence of this political decision, suddenly found itself in the role of a junior partner. It
took a letter by Parkinson to Riesenhuber to clarify that the British intended to remain
full members of the European Breeder Association,62
On February 16, 1989 the agreements finally were signed in Bonn. The R&D Agree-
ment was signed by CEA (Capron), UKAEA (Collier), Interatom (Berke/Brandstetter),
KfK (Böhm/Hennies); the Industrial Agreement was signed by Novatome (Villeneuve),
NNC (Taylor), Interatom (Berke), and INB (Bürkle). The Agreement on the Utilization of
Know-how was concluded between Serena (Rapin/Berke) and Fastec (Taylor). The re-
presentatives of Ansaldo had signed a few days before and were not present at the
ceremony; the Belgians had been refused accession to the Agreement by their Gov-
ernment a few days before.
Now work on the EFR project could truly begin.
3 The EFR Conceptual Design Phase
3.1 'Building the Administrative Structures
After the decision to pursue one single European breeder project instead of a number
of national projects, the necessary administrative structures were built up. This was no
mean task, given the large number of participating countries, firms, organizations, and
persons. It was even more difficult to get the whole machinery working and ensure its
efficiency. That this was achieved in a surprisingly short period of time was stated re-
peatedly later on, also expressed publicly, especially by the utilities.
In anticipation of the problems to be solved, all participants suppressed their national
egotisms.
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3.1.1 EFRUG Sets the Goals
The electricity utilities associated in the European Fast Reactor Utilities Group
(EFRUG) expected the reactor designers to include in the EFR conceptual design the
best features of SNR 2, Superphenix 1 and Superphenix ,2, and CDFR. In a nutshell,
EFR was to be technically better and cheaper than any of the above national projects.
On top of that, EFRUG formulated these basic'principles:63 ,64
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Design activities were to be
backed by a broad research and
development program carried out
by the government R&D organiza-
tions.
It was to be flexible with respect
to fuel production, Le., allow vari-
able plutonium breeding ratios to
be adopted.
It was to be optimized in terms of
capital cost and availability, thus
representing a model of commer-
cial breeders to be built in com-
petition with thermal reactors ap-
proximately from the year 2010
on.
EFR was to make the best use of the (passive) safety features of breeder
technology and was to be licensable in all partner countries.
It was to be a robust design, especially with regard to the steam generators, and
was to offer good accessibility for
inspection and maintenance.
(5)
(4)
(3)
(1 )
(2)
COFR (VK) 3300wrNt SNR·2 (FR Germany) 3420wrNt
There was also agreement between Comparison of EFR with earlier national designs.
the utilities and industry that EFR was
to be a large monolithic breeder power plant of approximately 1500 MWe power. At that
time, EFRUG had no interest in small modular plants, although that development in the
USA was observed, and the design companies on both sides of the Atlantic again and
again were encouraged to exchange technical and economic data.65
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The supervisory body in EFRUG was the so-calied EFRUG Board composed of high-
level representatives of EdF, RWE, ENEL, and Nuclear Electric (NE), formerly CEGB.
PreußenElektra and Bayernwerk joined later; UNESA (Spain), became associate mem-
bers. The executive function of EFRUG was provided by a Secretariat of four very com-
mitted middle managers who handled day-to-day business, especially providing the in-
terface with the design companies and the R&D organizations. In technical matters, the
Secretariat was assisted by the Project Management Team of the vendors, described
below. There was no project leader, an omission which the PMT and the MGRD occa-
sionally had reason to regret.
3.1.2 The Design CompEmies Gel Organized
When design activities for EFR began (the official date was later fixed as March 1988),
also the participating reactor vendors organized themselves. Interatom, Novatome, and
NNC as signatories to the Industrial Agreement together set up the EFR Associates
(EFR Ass. and EFR.A, respectively) consortium; Ansaldo and Belgonucleaire acted as
subcontractors in specialized areas. The engineering capacity of these companies
comprised approximately 250 persons; for the first, the Conceptual Design Phase, an
expense of approximately 500 man-years had been estimated. The budget for EFR.A
amounted to some DM 50 million per annum.66 ,67
The main systems of EFR were to be planned at the company locations of Bergisch
Gladbach, Lyons, and Risley where the proven organizational structures existing in
those places could be used. Engineering Areas in line with the expertise of companies
were defined as responsibilities. In this way, Novatome became responsible for the
primary system, NNC for the core and for handling, and Interatom for the secondary
system, the decay heat removal system, and the nuclear island. This rather coarse sub-
division, of course, permitted also other design companies to engage in a work pack-
age, if their knowledge allowed them to do SO.68
The Project Management Team (PMT) set up by EFR Associates was responsible for
overall coordination and control of the engineering activities, but also for more general
problems of safety, quality assurance, codes, and economic evaluations. The Director
of the PMT was Kurt Ebbinghaus of Interatom; he was supported by two deputies
(C. MitcheII, NNC, and M. Debru, Novatome), and nine project engineers, each with a
Organizational structures of
EFR, the European Fast Reactor Cooperation.
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EFRUG Board
Heads of Delegations Technical Commlth.!
tdk, -riJ., 11
Management Group Projecl Management Team :== EFRUG SeeretarlatResearch and Development
liaison Agents Project Hanagement Group
Technical Secretariat
11
Workin GrOUDS AGT
11
National National EFRUG Utillty Hembers:
R&D Organizations: Design Companles: U EdF
D CEA =Inhratom I Siemens) U ENEL=KfK/lnteratom ~ NNC Ltd. ~ NE
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specific responsibility within the EFR Project. The PMT office was opened in Lyons in
June 1990,69
The Supervisory Board supervised the activities of the PMT. It was staffed with two
high-level representatives each from the company managements of Novatome and
Interatom and NNC, and handled important policy maUers for the entire project.
3.1.3 Managing the R&D Activities
The management duty of the R&D organizations was to direct the R&D activities at the
thirteen research centers in the three partner countries, France, Britain, and Germany,
in the light of the needs of EFR. It has been mentioned above that, up until 1988, those
organizations had exclusive-
Iy supported the national
projects, KNK 11, SNR 300,
SNR 2, Phenix, Superphe-
nix 1 and Superphenix 2,
PFR, and CDFR. That objec-
tive had to be abandoned in
favor of the new common
project, EFR, although the
reactors already in operation
(KNK 11, Phenix, Superphe-
nix 1, PFR), of course, had
to be supported also in the future. Consequently, one of the main activities of R&D
management was to identify current research needs and avoid duplication (or even trip-
Iication) of effort in existing research programs.
A project management staff was set up also for these purposes by the R&D entities to
deal with the organizational aspects of this task. The existing Mangement Subcommit-
tee (MSC) was enlarged and developed into the Management Group for Research and
Development (MGRD) effective November 1989. Five to six representatives at the level
of Project Managers of CEA (2), KfK (1), Interatom (1), and UKAEA (1 - 2) regularly met
to coordinate the R&D efforts associated with EFR. The author of this report was ap-
pointed Permanent Chairman of the group and (full-time) Executive Director. For this
reason he gave up his position as Head of the Fast Breeder Project (PSB) at the Karls-
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ruhe Nuclear Research Center effective December 31, 1989, not realizing that the EFR
Praject - as initially envisaged - would be over only four years later. The MGRD met
raughly six times a year to discuss the main items of the whole program and accept the
most important results. Another important duty of the MGRD was the setting of annual
goals for the Working Graups (AGT).
AGT - Working Groups:
Fuel Elements and
Gore Materials
AGT1
The Executive Director and the MGRD were supported by a Technical 8ecretariat, the
Liaison Agents and the AGT Working Groups. The Technical 8ecretariat (T8) was
located partly at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center and mainly at CEA Cada-
rache, and comprised 4 - 5 technical specialists delegated there by their countries of
origin for periods of 2 - 3 years (plus typists). The
T8 pravided technical support service, administered
the work contral system, and played an important
part in reporting the R&D results.
AGT2A Sodium Ghemistry
AGT2B Instrumentation
AGT3 Gore Physics
AGT4 Safety Research
AGTS Thermal Hydraulics and
Gore Mechanics
AGT6 Reactor Vessel, Handling,
and Auxiliaries
AGT7 Thermal Transfer Systems
and Gomponents
AGTS Reactor Operation
In contrast to the Technical 8ecretariat, the three
Liaison Agents (LA) resided in their respective coun-
tries. They were the first persons to be consulted
whenever a designer needed R&D support. It was
their duty to feed these R&D requirements into the
relatively complex structure of the R&D partners and
monitor the resultant activities. In addition, the LA
played an important rale in drafting the Annual R&D
Reports.
AGT 9 B Structural Integrity
AGT 9 A Plant Structural Materials Mention has already been made of the Working
Graups (AGT) with one national coordinator each.
They met raughly twice a year to harmonize the
R&D activities in their areas of responsibility and, in addition, arranged special ist meet-
ings when required. The regular reports by the AGT constituted the substance of the
deliberations of the MGRD. In a way, the AGT constituted the backbone of the R&D
management structure.
The body supervising the MGRD was the 8teering Committee; it set the overall
R&D policy. It was composed of four high-level members each of the partner countries
(one of whom came fram the design organizations), and the Executive Director. Chair-
manship ratated annually among the highest ranking representatives of CEA, KfK, and
AEA. The SC met twice a year in dif-
ferent places for discussions of topics,
such as the national nuclear power sit-
uation, important technical questions
of detail, matters of international coop-
eration and agreements, etc. At those
meetings, the Executive Director regu-
larly reported about the R&D Program
and about the budget available.
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Mr. H. Mausbeck Interatom 7/1984 - 9/1985
Mr. R. Lallement CEA 9/1985 - 5/1987
Mr. W. Marth KfK 5/1987 - 11/1988
Mr. R. Lallement CEA 11/1988 - 10/1989
Mr. A. M. Broomfield AEA 10/1989 -11/1990
Mr. H.-H. Hennies KfK 11/1990 - 11/1991
Mr. J. Bouchard CEA 11/1991 - pres.
List of Chairmen of the Steering Committee.
The ways in which these bodies worked will be described in greater detail in the next
chapter.
3.2 Planning EFR
3.2.1 The Timescale of the Project
The EFR time schedule provided for several, clearly separated, project sections,?O,71
The Conceptual Design Phase extended over aperiod of two years, from the official
start of the project in March 1988 to March 1990. During that period, the conceptual
design of EFR was to be completed. One intermediate step was the First Consistent
Design to be presented to EFRUG already in September 1988. It still contained a large
number of design options, which were eliminated step by step in the course of 1989 or
were clearly marked alternative or fall-back solutions, respectively.
In the course of the ensuing Concept Validation Phase (3/1990 - 3/1993) the systems
engineering of EFR was to be completed. In-depth studies were to be conducted both
of the crucial design features and of innovative alternatives. Moreover, the safety phi-
losophy of EFR was to be checked by an independent body of European experts.
Finally, the costs and the economic potential of the plant were to be evaluated relative
to those of light water reactors,?2
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Phase 4
The next two project phases, understandably, were not yet planned to the end. In the
Pre-construction Phase (1993 - 1997), the important siting decision was to be taken,
detailed planning, including the balance of plant (BOP), to be finished, and licensing in
the host country to be achieved on the basis of the Safety Analysis Report. The subse-
quent Construction Phase (1997 - 2005) was to be devoted to the construction and
commissioning of EFR, for which a span of seven years was deemed sufficient.
Unfortunately, it proved to be impossible to complete this schedule, and the EFR Pro-
ject in its initial structure was halted at the end of the Concept Validation Phase.
3.2.2 The Technical Design 01 EFR
This chapter describes the status of technical planning of EFR as presented to the utili-
ties in early 1990, after completion of the Conceptual Design Phase.73 ,74,75
The nuclear island rested entirely on a single foundation, and most of the buildings
were seismically separated by rubber isolators tuned to a frequency of approx. 1 Hz.
The centerpoint of the plant was the circular reactor building, surrounded by three sat-
eUite steam generator buildings. Maintenance facilities for active components and fuel
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handling cells for fresh and irradiated fuels were located outside the reactor build-
ing.76 ,77
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The core was designed to have
two enrichment zones and both
axial and radial breeding blan-
kets. The fuel management
scheme was based on a six-
year in-pile time of the fuel.
Two core versions (homoge-
neous and axially heteroge-
neous) and two core layouts
with different breeding gains
were selected for further study.
A typical option for the homoge-
neous core included 346 fuel
elements, 72 breeder elements, and an internal store with 262 positions. The target
burnup for the fuel elements was 20 at.% (190 dpa NRT), which certainly was rather
ambitious. The core height had been fixed at 140 cm, for the time being. Two indepen-
dent shutdown systems were provided, each consisting of a trip system and an ab-
sorber rod system.78
The primary system included six intermediate heat exchangers and three primary
pumps. This led to a primary vessel of 17 m diameter, which was rather small com-
pared to the previous SPX 1 design. The intermediate heat exchangers were fitted with
mechanical seals and valves; the pumps were designed for single impellers and sub-
critical shafts. The internal store mentioned above was cooled by forced circulation.
The double rotating shield was used with both direct and offset arm refueling machines.
The above-core structure accommodated, inter aHa, the instrumentation for delayed
neutron detection and fuel assembly temperature control.79
The secondary system transports the heat from the primary system to the steam cir-
cuits. The choice of six intermediate heat exchangers and six steam generators allowed
a six-Ioop configuration, with each loop being similar in layout and offering improved
availability and functional benefits. The steam generators were once-through, straight-
tube units made of 9Cr1 MoVNb ferritic steel. The "REGAIN" design concept employed
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a location of the secondary pumps at a low level. The benefits of this concept were the
short pipe routes which were expected to save costs.80
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The decay heat removal concept
was intended to minimize safety-
graded emergency power supplies.
Six dip coolers in the primary ves-
sei were connected to six sodium-
air coolers arranged in natural-
draught air stacks. The main pipes
connecting the components were
designed to have low flow resis-
tances in order to enhance natural
circulation. The general approach
was to strengthen the passive capabilities by means of natural sodium circulation. 81
This brief description of EFR should be taken with a grain of salt, because the design
was still very much under development in 1990, and was modified considerably in some
respects in the ensuing phase. The reduction of the core height was just one case in
point,82
3.3 Backing by R&D
At many points the design groups working on EFR approached the limits of their knowl-
edge. In most cases, this concerned problems of material, often also thermohydraulic
problems, even questions of physics. In those cases they expected the R&D organiza-
tions to answer inimediately, if possible, or launch the appropriate research programs.
The structure of the R&D Program and the most important topics treated will be de-
scribed below,83
3.3.1 The Structures of the R&D Programs
At the beginning of the EFR Project, the thirteen research centers in the three partner
countries handled roughly 1200 individual R&D tasks, employing approximately 1000
statt members for these activities. Keeping track of all those activities and tailoring
64
them optimally to the needs of the industrial design companies occasionally resembled
the effort involved in keeping a bag of fleas. The program had to be given a certain
structure, and this was achieved in various ways.84 ,85
A so-called "Blue Book" Iisted all R&D activities, Le., all the single tasks described
above. It also indicated who was responsible for performing those activities. In another
step, these tasks were condensed into some 140 Work Packages. These packages
were ruled by detailed timetables within which the interim steps had to be completed
and the expected interim results produced. So-called Work Package Officers were
nominated to check compliance with these outlines.
Percentage of Contributions of the Partners
Topic Overall EFR (percentage)
R & D Budget FRG UK France
Core 30 33 17 50
Primary circuit thermalhydraulics 5 9 30 61
Decav heat removal 10 88 1 11
Safetv 25 51 11 38
Steam Qenerator units 7 11 27 62
Structural materials and desiQn rules 12 34 33 33
ln-service inspection and repair 6 65 12 23
Core instrumentation 1 29 34 37
Components, auxiliary systems and 4 48 2 50
handling
100 %
Allocation of 1991 R&D budget to topics and partners.
The next step in coordination was represented by the AGT mentioned above, an acro-
nym derived from Arbeitsgruppen/Groupes de Travail. The eleven AGT covered the en-
tire Fast Breeder Research Program,. both the EFR-related program and the fundamen-
tal program extending beyond that framework. Later on., an ad hoc group for in-service
inspection and repair (ISIR) was added. The AGT differed clearly in scope (and claims
on the budget). The highest expenditures were incurred in the area of the core (AGT 1,
AGT 3, and AGT 5). This was followed by safety (AGT 4), while sodium technology
(AGT 2A) and instrumentation (AGT 2B) required only comparatively small budget
amounts.86
Also the degrees of involvement of the three partner countries differed (deliberately).
Core studies were conducted mainly in France, also because the required reactors
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were available there. In the areas of decay heat removal and safety, the German R&D
organizations, KfK and Interatom, bore the main brunt. When it came to problems of
steam generators and materials, the British were exceptionally strong, also because of
their sorry PFR experiences,87
3.3.2 Main Activities of the AGT
The main areas of research covered by the AGT will be described below. In some
instances, the subject catalog of a working group comprised more than 100 specific
tasks. Consequently, this description can provide only a very rough outline of the re-
search areas covered by an AGT,8a
AGT 1: Fuel Elements and Gore Materials
The scope of AGT 1 was to study fuel elements and core
materials in the light of their out-of-pile and in-pile
behavior. For this reason, the performance of MOX fuel
and several steel categories for claddings and wrappers
during reactor irradiation was analyzed,89 In addition,
modeling codes were provided, and failed fuel as weil as
absorbers were studied.90 ,91
AGT 2A: Sodium Ghemistry
Cross section 01 PE16 pin with
21.7 at.% burnup.
The mandate of AGT 2A was to control sodium quality and sodium purification, the be-
havior of trapping devices, and the methods of decontamination and waste treatment.
Sodium impurity sensors were installed to check their suitability for practical plant
use.92
AGT28: Instrumentation
AGT 2B was charged with conducting R&D on core instrumentation and the continuous
monitoring instrumentation of steam generators; it also dealt with methods of viewing
and in-service inspection and repair under sodium. Various failed-fuel detection sys-
tems were studied and intercalibrated for various European fast breeder reactors.93
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AGT 3: Gore Physics
Typical structure 01 a critical
in the MASURCA plant.
AGT 3 was concerned with neutron physics and with
providing the data and tools for core and shielding de-
sign calculations. Large experimental facilities used
were the Masurca reactor at Cadarache and the Nestor
reactor at Winfrith. A major task was the development
of the ERANOS common neutronics code system.94
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AGT 4: Safety Research
AGT 4 conducted studies of breeder safety, especially in connection with phenomena
in the core. Assessments of subassembly faults, sodium fires, containment loading,
and, in particular, the core disruptive accident were of great importance to design com-
panies. Molten fuel physics in connection with movements of fuel ejected from pins
were studied in various test facilities.95 ,96,97
AGT 5: Thermal Hydraulics and Gore Mechanisms
Chardis 111 rig arrangement.
AGT 5 studied the thermal hydraulics and
mechanics of the core as weil as core com-
ponents.98 Subassemblies distorted as a
consequence of irradiation effects were in-
vestigated in the CHARDIS 111 rig a Risley,
while the dynamic behavior of core arrays
during earthquakes was examined in the
RAPSODIE facility at Saclay. Flow patterns
at the core exit plane and between wrap-
pers were simulated at the HIPPO test rig
(Risley).99,100
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AGT 6: Reactor Vessel, Handling, and Auxiliaries
AGT 6 was involved in thermohydraulic studies in the primary and decay heat removal
systems by means of facilities such as THOR (Risley) and ILONA (Bensberg); in addi-
tion, R&D was conducted on the thermal environment of the top shield and the fuel
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handling systems. Elastomer seals were tested extensively with respect to friction, tem-
pereature, and irradiation. 101 ,102
AGT 7: Thermal Transfer Systems and Components
The mandate of AGT 7 primarily was to study the main components of the heat transfer
system, such as steam generatores, intermediate heat exchangers, and mechanical
pumps. The assessment of sodium-water interactions, thermal hydraulics codes, and
the cavitation problem constituted the main areas of work of this group. Supercritical
pump shafts were treated at Saclay.103,104
AGT 8: Reactor Operation
This AGT was concerned with exchanging experiences arising from the operation of the
European fast breeder reactors, namely Phenix, Superphenix, PFR, and KNK 11. Com-
piling and comparing the radiation doses received by the personnei, and radioactivity
discharges constituted permanent topics. Experiences with fuel assembly handling and
the maintenance of large components were particularly valuable. 105,106,107
AGT 9A: Plant Structural Materials
This AGT was to provide verified materials data
to EFR designers. Materials of chief interest
were 316 L(SPH), mod 9Cr1 Mo, and carbon
steel. In addition, methods of non-destructive
testing were studied. Volumetrie inspection
techniques for austenitic steel varieties were
improved and made compatible with in-service
inspection requirements. 10B
Test rig tor creep-induced
tatigue experiments.
AGT 98: Structurallntegrity
This AGT was commissioned to study and produce common design rules in the field of
structural integrity so that the required standards of safety and reliability could be met.
In addition, methods were to be created which would allow the leak-before-break crite-
rion to be accepted. Benchmark comparisons were provided to validate the constitutive
equations and complex ineleastic computer models. 109 ,110
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4 The EFR Concept Validation Phase
4.1 Achievements of the EFR Assocciates
The EFR Consistent Design as presented to EFRUG by EFR Associates in Paris on
November 10, 1989 - the day after the Berlin wall had come down - was appreciated by
the utilities. It looked like a successful synthesis of SNR 2, Superphenix 2, and CDFR,
and also the support lent by the activities of the R&D organizations in studies of the re-
maining technical problems inspired confidence. The representative of the German
VEBA utility (Krämer), seemed to be so impressed that his company, together with the
Bayernwerk utility, joined the EFRUG consortium the year after.
In the ensuing Concept Validation Phase of three years (3/90 - 3/93) the EFR design
did not have to be modified greatly. Minor variations were proposed by EFRA.A, such
as the solid roof with its simpler cooling mode, or the three-zone core promising a
smoother flux pattern. For the rest, the efforts by the design companies were concen-
trated on analyzing the safety characteristics of the plant, deriving points by which its li-
censing capability could be judged, and elaborating reliable information about its eco-
nomic features. 111 ,112,113
4.1.1 Safe Design and Risk Minimization
EFRUG had requested that EFR meet a safety level no less stringent than that of a
modern thermal reactor. 114 The safety approach taken was that of defense in depth
based on the detection and prevention of faults, and mitigation of accidents exceeding
the design basis. 115 A considerable enhancement of these conventional systems was
foreseen by the introduction of a third shutdown level to exploit and reinforce the natu-
ral safety characteristics of the system and exclude core damage even in the event of
a failure of the shutdown systems. 116 ,117, 118
Here are some of the major characteristics of this shutdown level:
(1) A favorable core geometry and optimized reactivity coefficients were sought. This
required a reduction of the EFR core height from the original 1.4 m to 1.0 m and,
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hence, a reduced sodium volume fraction, which proved to be beneficial, though
entailing a number of economic penalties (annual instead of biannual refueling).
(2) Optimization of the core restraint system and the negative coefficient of reactivity
from radial expansion. This meant stiffening the subassembly wrappers at the up-
per restraint plane to enhance effects of radial core expansion. 119
(3) Enhancement of absorber rod expansion, which comprised the inclusion of com-
ponents in the control rod drive lines which significantly enhanced, by factors of 3
or more, the natural thermal expansion of the control rods relative to the core. 120
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Other safety components included stroke limiting devices, absorber rod magnets, and
absorber bu!k insertion. The efficiency of the third shutdown level was analyzed in
depth by the Risk Minimization Group (RMG) under
the competent chairmanship of H. Vossebrecker,
Interatom; the final report comprising some
350 pages was submitted in July 1992. It c1aimed
that no scenario of core disruption would be in the
realm of credibility. However, even then it was not
possible to exclude absolutely the potential for core
disruption. Some reasonable capability to contain
the consequences of such failures was still judged
to be necessary.121,122
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The results of the EFR safety case were presented
to a special group in 1992/1993. This so-called
Ad Hoc Safety Club (AHSC) included well-known
senior safety experts from France (Queniart, Natta) ,
Germany (Birkhofer, Löffler), and the UK (Wright,
Hirst). In the course of eight sessions they analyzed
the major safety systems and components of EFR
and expressed (personal) statements on the sub-
jects. In conclusion, their response was quite favor-
able. The principal design and the proposed safety goals were probably acceptable in
the respective countries. Some concern was expressed about the (diminished) protec-
tion against an airplane crash of the steam generators. For the containment the Club
suggested to take into account the new criteria for the new generation of pressurized
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water reactors; filters should be provided for radiation protection in case of severe
accidents.123
A drop of bitterness in this cup of joy, however, was the request by AHSC at its final
meeting in March 1992 for calculations of core meltdown accidents, even for the phase
of recriticality, despite existing provisions for risk minimization.
4.1.2 On the Economics of EFR
Dip Cooler
lDHX)
Reaetor Vessel
Expansion Vessel
stack
1I'U----Hf-- Sodium/Air
Heat Exchanger
EFR direct decay heat removal system.
Of course, a distinction had to be made
between the higher cost of a first-of-a-
kind plant (FOAK) and the lower cost of
a successive series of identical breeder
plants. In addition, special costs played a role which could arise from one partner coun-
try, in contrast to the others, imposing excessive Iicensing requirements in one part of
an area ("national tuning").
Defining the cost structure and the economic characteristics of EFR were the primary
purposes of EFR.A, in addition to safety considerations, in the second half of the Con-
cept Validation Phase. Especially the utilities had an interest in these questions, and so
a special working group was constituted
of experts from the PMT and EFRUG. It
was to ensure, above all, that identical
methods and datasets were used in the
economic assessment calculations. Two
yardsticks were available for cost com-
parison purposes: primarily, of course,
the electricity generating costs of com-
peting light water reactor power plants
similar in size, but also the costs of Su-
perphel,lix 1, which were known by then.
The former probably would never be
matched entirely, while the latter c1early
had to be underrun. 124 ,125
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Cost reductions were attempted in various ways:
(1) By simplifying and streamlining plant design.
In this eftort, especially the number of components and their weights as weil as
the building volumes were reduced.
(2) By limiting the number of safety-graded systems.
In this case, e.g., the expensive containment of the emergency Diesel power
plants was avoided and replaced by passive decay heat removal methods.
(3) By checking on the methods of manufacturing, especially in an attempt to shorten
the construction time of the power plant.
The construction period of EFR (not including commissioning) had been estimated
to run up to 60 months, counted from the first permanent structural concrete to
fuelloading.
(4) By increasing fuel burnup in order to save fuel cycle costs.
As is weil known, 20 at.% had been estimated, wh ich was quite achallenge, espe-
cially to the R&D sector.
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WHOLE PRIMARY SYSTEM
As a result of these
measures, the
amount of steel
used in the princi-
pal parts of the nu-
c1ear steam supply
system (NSSS)
was reduced by
some 50%. For the
NSSS of EFR this
meant a cost re-
duction by 45%
(relative to Super-
phenix 1), and still
of 10% re lative to
Superphenix 2. 126 ,127
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In 1992, PMT/EFRUG spent appraximately 150 man-months to determine the estimated
cost of the nuclear island. Nineteen qualified vendors in four countries were invited to
tender for 25 key components. The 59 bids received constituted the basis on which the
price of the nuclear island was calculated. In February 1993, the EFRUG customer was
told that ECU 1.8 billion had been estimated for a one-off plant, ECU 1.3 million for a
one-of-a-series plant. 128,129 The utilities, in turn, presented a comparison of electricity
generating costs, thereby indicating that the EFR series would be compatible with ad-
vanced PWRs.
4.2 Results and Facilities of the R&D Organizations
During the two project phases of EFR a number of important R&D findings were made,
some of which will be briefly enumerated below. They frequently required new test
facilities to be built. Some of the particularly expensive test rigs will also be de-
scribed. 130
4.2.1 Major R&D Achievements
In the reactor core, the in-pile characteristics of the MOX fuel rads had to be assured.
Especially the French and British breeder plants were available for this purpose. In
Phenix, a maximum burnup of 16.4%, corresponding to 143 dpa, was achieved for the
austenitic 15/15 Ti cladding tube materials: In PFR, the comparable levels for the high-
nickel PE16 cladding tube materials already amounted to 21.7 and 135 dpa, respec-
tively. A total of approximately 250,000 rads were irradiated. The sodium-bonded ab-
sorbers attained in-pile times of approximately 600 full-Ioad days in the reactors listed
above. 131 ,132, 133
In core physics, it was possible to complete experimentally and evaluate the CONRAD
criticals for axially heterogeneous cores. The harmonized ERANOS 0.2 code system
was tested successfully and delivered to the partners. Also the shielding experiments
for the JANUS pragram were completed. 134 ,135
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In core mechanics, the CHARDIS experi-
ments indicated that even minor misorien-
tations of subassemblies can cause sur-
prisingly high pad loads. In the seismic
experiments conducted in the RAPSODIE
rig it was seen how important the stiffness
of the reactor diagrid is to safety.136
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Studies of the thermal hydraulics 01 the
primary system were concentrated main-
lyon the hot pool. A number of special
rigs were available for this purpose, espe-
cially those at Cadarache and Risley. The
experiments confirmed the, fortunately,
stable flow behavior under all operating
conditions. To achieve a smooth surface
without any gas entering, R&D experts
suggested the use of porous baffles. Nu-
merous experiments showed that baffles, both in a high and in a low position, guaran-
teed the desired free surface behavior. 137,138
RAMONA water test model.
Studies of decay heat removal by
natural convection were carried out in
a number of test rigs at Karlsruhe and
Bensberg. The RAMONA (1 :20 scale)
In the steam generator, one of the most important breeder components, reliable meth-
ods of acoustic detection were developed for leakage incidents. Other topics under in-
vestigation were sodium-water interactions, and a proposal was made to the design
companies to install anti-wastage sheets in the area of the lower tube plate in order to
avoid such events from propagating.
The thermohydraulic test of an entire
steam generator module in Phenix or
PFR was considered again and again,
but always rejected because of the
high cost associated (approx. FF100
million).139,140
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water test rig was one of the workhorses for a whole array of steady-state and transient
tests. ILONA, the 5 MW Na facility, allowed the design of the important helical tube
air-heat exchanger to be validated. 141 ,142
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Activities in the area of safety covered a
broad range of topiCS. 143 In addition to
code improvements for the design basis
conditions, the unlikely case, so impor-
tant to Iicensing, of a total instantaneous
blockage of a fuel element was exam-
ined. The mechanical responses were
calculated for roughly two dozen cases
Neul. Shield
of unprotected loss-of-flow conditions inEIl.
EFR; fortunately, they turned out to be
tolerable in most cases. The datasets of
the CABRI programme just completed
were very helpful in this case. In the wake of the Iicensing conditions imposed on Su-
perphenix, also sodium fire experiments were resumed, and various computer codes
were compared. 144 ,145
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With respect to materials,
the responsibility of Work-
ing Groups AGT 9A/9B,
very fruitful cooperation
was established with the
Design and Construction
Rules Committee (DCRC),
a group of experts on the
side of the design com-
panjes. A large number of
milestone and synthesis re-
ports confirmed steady
progress in the materials
field. Thus, e.g., for the
316 L(N) base metal, the
stress-rupture data were verified experimentally up to 73,500 hours; for mod9Cr steel,
the creep-rupture data were determined for the 500 - 650°C temperature range. Of con-
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siderable importance were the defect assessment procedures for the leak-before-break
and high temperature areas. 146 , 147, 148
Major progress was achieved also in in-service inspection and repair and in core in-
strumentation as weil as large components. It is not possible, though, to discuss
these items in detail within the framework of this report. 149
4.2.2 Major R&D Investments
Expecting the EFR project to run for a longer period of time than it actually did, the part-
ners built up a number of major experimental facilities in which R&D programs were to
be run. In most cases, they succeeded only in part, as the project was terminated after
the completion of Phase 2, and the time available for experimenting had been too short.
Nevertheless, some of these test facilities will be described briefly below.
In the United Kingdom, especially the HIPPO, THOR, CHARDIS 111, and SUPERNOAH
test rigs should be mentioned. HIPPO (in Risley), a water test rig on a 1:5 scale, al-
lowed the flow patterns at the core exit plane and between the wrappers to be simu-
lated. Flow velocities in the interstitial gaps could be measured by means of sophisti-
cated instrumentation, such as laser Doppler anemometry. THOR, also located in Ris-
ley, was commissioned in October 1990. It represented an 0.3 scale water model used
primarily to observe the hot pool flow and quantify free surface conditions and potential
gas entrainment. The CHARDIS 111 rig, also in Risley, was commissioned as late as in
December 1991. It consisted of 61 subassemblies for studies of distortions and loads
occurring during charging and discharging operations. The dummy fuel elements were
provided by the French CEA, modified by Interatom in Bensberg, and finally used in
CHARDIS 111 - an example of a successful European cooperation. The last major British
test rig to be mentioned here, SUPERNOAH in Dounreay, was used to study medium-
sized sodium-water leaks in steam generators. It did not become operational un-
til 1993.150 ,151
In Germany, especially a number of test facilities for decay heat removal studies were
completed in the second project phase. One of them was the NEPTUN test rig, a
1:5 scale water model in Karlsruhe. It had an electrically heated core of 337 elements
with apower of 1.6 MW. The facility was commissioned in December 1991 and allowed
only a limited experimental program to be handled for EFR. On an even larger scale,
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this was true of KIWA, a 1:10 scale water model, also at KfK, designed to simulate the
whole flow path of natural convection; it was commissioned in September 1992. The
5 MW ILONA plant for simulation
of the sodium heat removal sys-
tem was commissioned in Bens-
berg in November 1990. It was
completed early enough to allow
some important experiments to be
performed, including those in-
volving the station blackout acci-
dent. Unfortunately, ILONA later
was damaged severely by a sodi-
um fire and will be dismantled by
Siemens when the Bensberg 10-
cation will be abandoned. 152 ,153,154
In France, under the auspices of -5 m ~~~::===-====--'
CEA, the JESSICA test rig for stu- ILONA test facility for decay heat removal.
dies of the core outlet thermocou-
pies, and the MIRSA facility for studies of the argon gas phase, were completed at
Cadarache in 1992 and 1993, respectively. As the French breeder programs will be
carried on in connection with Phenix/Superphenix, and several EFR-related topics, it is
safe to assume that these rigs will continue to be used.
4.3 Convening and Reporting
4.3.1 Meetings galore
Despite such tools as electronic mail or fax equipment, personal meetings of members
at all levels were indispensable in the execution of the EFR project. Discussions about
technical points among five or ten experts, often together with the experimentalists at
the site of a test rig, produced results only in personal debates, not by a way of corre-
spondence. In the second project stage, the Concept Validation Phase, some
500 meetings were held in various places in the three partner countries within aperiod
of three years, roughly ten percent of them at project management level (MGRD, PMT,
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PMG). Although the financial expenditures associated with this "nuclear tourism" were
a source of constant complaints, they only played a minor role in the overall budget.
The international conferences, which kept participants from their project activities for a
week or even longer, certainly had greater financial implications. 155
Most of the meetings were held at the level of AGT and their subgroups, sometimes
5 - 10 of them. Each country was represented by at least one delegate; often also ob-
servers from EFR.A and EFRUG as weil as members of the Technical Secretariat at-
tended and expressed their opinions. The most important agenda items normally were
discussions and evaluations of the research findings generated, and the inclusion of
new subjects of future activity. Occasionally, agreement was established on the dele-
gation of a staff member to the installation of a partner country. As a rule, this was very
beneficial to all concerned; however, the willingness to be delegated into a neighboring
country declined with advancing age of the candidates (for family reasons).
Twice a year the PMT invited the reactor design experts to so-calied workshops at
which the current design status of EFR was discussed and further activities were
agreed upon. These results also had to be sold to the utilities, which was done through
the monthly Project Reviews. The representatives of the utilities in the Project
Management Group, PMG, had a decisive say in these matters and put down their
opinions also in written comments after each meeting. Many items were the subjects of
heated debates, such as the degree of passiveness of EFR, but never did they detract
from the good personal relations among the delegates from R&D, EFR Associates, and
EFRUG.
The project language used at these meetings was English. It had been chosen as a
Iingua franca already in the era of German-French cooperation, and was retained, with-
out debate, when the British joined. Although the Continental representatives managed
to express themselves in English, this was an area where the British representatives
scored a clear advantage. Whenever difficult topics arose in the discussion, they were
able to speak their native language, use the right shades of meaning and thus, as a
rule, get their points across in an optimum way. That this also entailed a "drawback" will
be discussed in the next section.
Also the styles in which the discussions were conducted differed considerably at the
beginning of the talks. The British, because of their traditional training, were accus-
tomed to leading different opinions to a consensus in the course of a debate. The de-
78
bates were handled as in a club. The French seemed to send their representatives to
those meetings with certain instructions. At least this was the impression they gave at
the beginning of this phase of cooperation. At times, Paris (and Saclay, respectively,)
were never very far. In contrast, the German representatives, especially those of KfK,
often excelled in demonstrating their (fierce) individualism, some of them even seeming
to obey nothing but their engineer's conscience.
A factor much more important than the language or the style of discussions was the
relationship of trust among the participants from so many different countries. We
should recall that the SNR 2, Superphenix 2, and CDFR Projects initially were competi-
tors and, consequently, their national representatives were in opposition to each other.
Although EFR meant concentration on one project, there were still subtle national pref-
erences. It was generally known, for instance, that the German representatives favored
an all-passive decay heat removal more than the French experts did. Among the clad-
ding material steel varieties, there was a British variant (PE16) and a German-French
preference (15/15 Ti). However, as time went on, the participants in the project came to
know the arguments of their partners better and better, which helped them to under-
stand each other's position
and, finally, establish a true
basis of trust. This became
apparent in particular on oc-
casions in the course of the
project when it was easily
possible to ask the represen-
tative of country A to argue,
neutrally and without bias, the
position of country C in coun-
try B.
Let's have a break Even the most important
(right to left: J. Bouchard, CEA - A. M. Broomfield, AEA; the author). meetings must adjourn for
lunch. The hospitality offered
by the three partner countries was excellent, especially so in France. For the British
and the Germans, this occasionally had grave consequences, for difficult agenda items
not dealt with before lunch had no chance of being taken up after a (French) lunch.
Consequently, another meeting had to be held, perhaps again in Cadarache.
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4.3.2 Documentation and Publications
No deliberation without documentation.
All meetings, of course, had to be covered in minutes which often had to be written by
those who had been able to argue their points in the most sophisticated way during the
meeting, namely the British. But there are two sides to each coin. The UK representa-
tives were able to use those documents for reporting to their Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI), while the other partners had to write separate reports in German and
French. Participants in these project meetings maintained that the minutes of a meeting
occasionally were better than the meeting.
The R&D organizations were expected to submit annual reports, which summarized
their research findings (in bulky tomes). These reports were compiled by the Working
Groups and by the Liaison Agents upon instructions by the MGRD.156 Another report
comparing the requirements raised by the design companies with the most important
results was compiled in cooperation with the PMT.157 Both reports constituted the basis
of two meetings a year of R&D, EFR.A, and EFRUG, at which the AGT Chairmen pre-
sented the results in their respective areas and had them discussed. The reports obvi-
ously were read very carefully by the representatives of the EFRUG Secretariat and the
Project Management Group (PMG), for the so-called EFRUG comments, critical but
competent comments on the chapters of the report, regularly came in two or three
months later. In the next annual report, those comments were taken up and answered
by R&D.
In addition to this official project documentation, the R&D statt in Phase 2 compiled a
total of 1750 internal technical reports and memoranda. 158 250 publications and con-
terence papers were written internationally over the same period of time, mostly by sev-
eral authors trom various partner countries. These publications had to be distributed
before they were published or read in order to allow them to be commented upon and
corrected in accordance with a tormalized scheme. This procedure, which was also laid
down in the Cooperation Agreements, initially appeared to be a bit cumbersome, but
later worked very smoothly, much to the surprise of all concerned. EFR Associates, the
design company, completed some 5000 technical documents, the most important of
which was the Consistent Design Specification. Together with the utilities a comprehen-
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sive report on the economics of EFR was compiled which, for the first time, took into
account national cost structures.
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"What experimental evidence is
available to confirm the cleaning of
subassemblies up to 10 kW?" was
aas, while the request, "Provide
in-service detection techniques to
monitor the integrity of the main
and the safety vessel for EFRI"
was an OS demanding a PgS.
Managing the roughly 200 OS and 120 OS took a tightly run organization, because
each of these requirements implied considerable financial expenditures. The Liaison
Agents (LA) were responsible for ensuring that all national partners and agencies were
queried and the focused, authorized answer was returned to the design companies.
The bureaucratic effort involved was immense, but was bravely coped with by the LA.161
The floods of (written) requirements by the design companies reaching the R&D organi-
zations were registered and answered with particular care. There were two categories
of such queries: Question Sheets
(QS) and Objective Sheets (OS).
A question sheet normally was an-
swered by an Answer Sheet (AS)
based on existing R&D know-how,
while a Program Sheet (PgS) had
to be drafted in reply to an Objec-
tive Sheet, because it meant that a
new research program had to be
initiated.159,160
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A very special type of publication was the EFR Newsletter. In a way, it was the popular
newspaper of the project distributed to all members, irrespective of rank and title. It reg-
ularly published the most important ....- --,
R&D findings, covered the work-
shops of EFR.A and the other meet-
ings, and presented rundowns of
management news and world breed-
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er news. Readers obviously read the list of publications at the end with great attention
for, whenever a publication had been omitted, the (angry) author remonstrated with the
two Karlsruhe editors. 162
Last, but not least, there was a "textile" documentation, the EFR tie. The creative idea
was developed by the author together with Tony Broomfield on a train ride between
Düsseldorf and Karlsruhe in the autumn of 1990. They envisaged a kind of English club
tie as a token of connection among project members. In order to gather as many ideas
as possible, a tie competition was run in EFR Newsletter No. 3. It was won by
Ray Tant, design draughtsman with NNC Ud., the British partner of EFR Associates.
The German side introduced the distinct green diagonal stripe to reflect the "zeitgeist"
in that country.
5 The End of the EFR Project
5.1 Problems with the Breeder Plants
In the late eighties and early nineties, the problems in operating the existing breeder
plants became more and more evident. SNR 300, though completed in 1985, was beset
by political problems after Germany's second largest political party had pledged to opt
out of nuclear energy and blocked the Iicensing procedure. PFR in Dounreay from the
outset had been allotted only abrief life span, which was reduced even further by vari-
ous technical troubles, among which the ingress of oil into sodium turned out to be
most aggravating. The French breeders, Phenix and Superphenix, finally suffered from
technical problems likely to create political consequences. 163 ,164
The difficulties experienced by these reactor plants will be described in slightly more
detail below because, ultimately, they contributed a fair share to the demise of the EFR
Project.
"Nothing but gaps wherever you look"
(Kölner Stadt Anzeiger, 1982).
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5.1.1 Political Termination of SNR 300
In April 1988, the SNR 300 German prototype breeder was still waiting in vain for its
operating permit. Almost three years had passed since its completion, and all national
and international expert bodies had
confirmed its safe design. 165,166 At that
point, Klaus Töpfer, the German Feder-
al Minister for the Environment, decided
to take a drastic measure. In a formal
instruction, he requested the Düssel-
dorf State Government to restart the li-
censing pracedure for Kalkar and, in
particular, refrain fram commissioning
any further expert opinions seeking to
establish comparisons of Chernobyl
and Kalkar. 167 In that instruction, the
Federal Minister for the Environment had Iisted criteria to be adopted by the State
authorities in the future management of the licensing procedure. Under the German
constitution, such instructions by the Federal Government to a Federal State are al-
lowed, although they happen very rarely.168,169
Nevertheless, the licensing procedure dragged on for another six months until, sur-
prisingly, one day before the deadline, the State of North Rhine-Westphalia sued the
Federal Government before the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. In its motion,
the State argued that the Federal Government, in giving it instructions, had violated the
independence of the State.
"Courts of law and God's mills grind exceedingly slowly," the saying goes, and it took
until May 1990 for the ruling to come fram Karlsruhe. It proved to be a major disappoint-
ment to the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, for their action was dismissed on all
points. The judges found that the Federal Government had not been ultra vires in in-
structing the State Government. In addition, in the written explanations of the decision,
greater expert competence in the Iicensing procedure under the Atomic Energy Act was
attributed to the Federal Government. Minister Töpfer had every reason to be satisfied
with this outcome of the legal dispute. 17o
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But the State put up more opposition. Only one week after the ruling by the Constitu-
tional Court, the Iicensing authority in Düsseldorf announced its intention to commis-
sion a detailed report on the status of emergency planning and evacuation of the
Kalkar Nuclear Power Station. That subject was the sole responsibility of the State and,
being outside the Atomic Energy Act, could not be influenced by any instructions from
Bonn. This augured lengthy discussions, and more topics in this vein surely would be
found in the future.
Construction schedule, SNR 300.
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In the autumn of 1990, adecision had to be taken about financing the extra costs for
the 500 remaining staff members of the project. Conditions could not have been worse.
SNR 300 in Kalkar 737475767778798081 82838485868788899091 92
had been com-
pleted five years
ago, but not the
slightest progress
had been made
since in securing an operating permit. On the contrary, the political escalation had in
fact aggravated the situation. It was now quite obvious that a license under the Atomic
Energy Act could not be obtained against the declared political intention of aState
Government, not even by Bonn.
For this reason, the vendor and the operator, in a discussion with Federal Minister of
Research Riesenhuber on March 20, 1991, decided to terminate officially the Kalkar
project. The political responsibility for the discontinuation of Kalkar was laid at the
doorstep of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia. The breeder option was to be kept
open within the framework of the EFR Project. 171
When SNR 300 was given up, also the smaller KNK 11 at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Re-
search Center was doomed to die, as almost the only purpose of that plant had been to
pave the way, technologically, for the Kalkar project. This had been done, e.g., by irra-
diating fuel variants to be used later in SNR 300. It had even been expressed in the
wording of the licenses under the Atomic Energy Act for KNK 11. When the
SNR 300/KNK 11 link had ceased to exist, these permits would have been open to court
action, especially in respect of their immediate execution. For this reason and a number
of others, KfK decided to shut down KNK permanentlyon August 23, 1991.172
Now Germany no longer had any fast breeder plant.
84
5.1.2. Oil Ingress at PFR
Patch-welding in PFR.
Finally the cap
isweldedto
the buttering
Defect
situated at
tee on weid
PFR had run most satisfactorily in 1986-1989, accumulating 80% of its total electricity
production over that period of time. In April 1990, however, a leak occurred in the re-
heater 1 vessel, and the reactor was shut
down. Inspection revealed a total of four de-
fects, all in the main circumferential welds of
the vessel. Three of the four welds were 10-
cated in areas where repairs had been done
already in 1987. It was believed that the cracks
were initiated by so-called delayed reheat
cracking. In that case, defect growth results
from the residual tensile stress in the weid. In
order to avoid further defects, a new repair
technique (patch welding) was developed and
carried out over the rest of the year. 173
In 1990 PFR, Iike other AEA plants, became subject to licensing by the UK Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate (Nil). In this respect, not only the safety case, but even proce-
dures, training, maintenance, documentation, etc. were continuously monitored. As far
as the safety case was concerned, the Nil identified one significant problem: the integ-
rity and mode of failure of the core support structure. This required PFR staff to devel-
op methods for the detection of a small tilt of the core as aprecursor to a rapidly devel-
oping failure. For this reason, one year later an instrument was installed which mea-
sured the horizontal and vertical movements of a neutron shield rod.
After repair of the steam generator units, PFR was back in operation until June 1991,
when a major incident occurred. At the end of run 24, the impurity level in the primary
sodium increased due to an ingress of oil from a main pump, later estimated at
35 liters. A team of AEA and NNC staff was put together to study the nature of this ef-
feet and its possible consequences. In addition, two experiments were done at IPPE,
Obninsk, Russia, which reproduced the conditions in PFR as c10sely as possible. A
new cold trap loop was installed at PFR to return the primary circuit impurity level back
to its original design value. The operation was successful, thereby reducing the sodium
plugging point from 225°C to an acceptable 150°C.
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Nil, the Iicensing authority, however, also requested to check the primary circuit com-
ponents for possible residual debris which might block the fuel element channels. For
this reason, the primary pump filters were removed and examined. Some of the mesh
filters, indeed, were found to be partly blocked by sodium-oil-products. Replacing the
filter panels was a very time consuming job because of obstructions in the penetrations.
Later on, the obstruction which prevented the first two filter units from being replaced,
was identified as broken thermocouple tubes. Special equipment had to be provided to
remove those broken components. During this repair work, aseries of flow tests were
carried out on all fuel subassemblies of the reactor. The results confirmed that there
were no further blockages.
Gross electricity generation of PFR 1975 - 1991.
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While the repair of PFR was still in full swing, unexpectedly positive news reached the
power plant. Nuclear Electric (NE), together with British Nuclear Fuels Ud. (BNFL) and
Scottish Nuclear Ud., expressed their readiness to grant PFR financial support. The
electricity utilities mentioned above
and the reprocessing company intend-
ed to cover the operating deficit of the
power plant for three years, provided
that the British Government was pre-
pared to move the original deadline for
decommissioning from 1994 to 1997.
The annual operating cost of PFR at
that time amounted to approximately
r30 million, of which some r11.6 mil-
lion was covered by sales of electricity
in the 1990/91 fiscal year, when the
plant had an availability of 33.7%. The
sponsors mentioned above expected a
future power plant availability in ex-
cess of 40%. The proposal of financial
assistance was officially submitted for
decision to the British Secretary for
Energy, John Wakeham, in December
1991.
When the filter panels were replaced, a routine check in the secondary circuit of PFR
showed a rattling noise in two evaporator units. The noise was caused by the rattling of
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a component caught in a leakage flow through part of the vessel. Over aperiod of time
the gaps had increased, allowing the steam tubesor tie rods to rattle. The noise was
successfully controlled by inserting chevron seals into the gaps.
In December 1992, nineteen months after shutdown due to the oil spillage, the reactor
was restarted. In January 1993, during severe storms, PFR was reconnected to the
grid, operating most of the time on two circuits because of problems in the conventional
part of the plant.
As will be shown in the next section, PFR was weil into its last year of operation.
5.1.3 licensing Problems with Phenix and Superphenix
In the early nineties, a number of incidents occurred also in the French Phenix proto-
type breeder, which had been run most satisfactorily so far. As a consequence, li-
censing problems arose which gave rise to long outages. Also in the large Superphenix
plant, incidents occurred which had grave impacts on the licensing situation.
In August 1989, Phenix was shut down twice because of the "negative reactivity" sig-
nal. Initially, electric defects in the area of the neutron chamber were assumed to be
the cause, but when there was another shutdown on September 14, the French safety
authority, Service Central de SOrete des Installations Nucleaires (SCSIN), ordered a
painstaking examination of the cause and the reactor was shut down by the operator in
October. 174 ,175
Neutron chamber signal in Ph{mix
(recorded on Sep. 9, 1990).
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MWThe scrams were assumed to have been
due to argon gas bubbles collected in
the area of the diagrid. Their abrupt
passage through the core could have
caused the reactor to be shut down be-
cause of the negative void coefficient.
As a consequence, the existing diagrid
purging holes, which appeared to be
blocked, were enlarged so that the gas
would be able to pass through the core
continuously and safely. Hydraulic tests
Arrt~t d'urgence par reactivite negative
Tree showing potential causes of PMnix transient
(schematic diagram, "Iogigramme").
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carried out in a water rig at Saclay seemed to confirm the effectiveness of the measure,
and recommissioning of the power plant was Iicensed in December.
However, one year later, in September 1990, another surprising shutdown for reactivity
reasons occurred. The transient showed two minima with a peak (at 107% of initial
power) in between, and then a decay reflecting the insertion of the control rods. Un-
fortunately, the scram occurred precisely at the moment when the tape of the in-care
instrumentation specially installed was being exchanged. As a consequence, it was not
possible to analyze the fine structure of the curve. Obviously, the gas bubble theory
was untenable and, consequently, was dropped. Instead, a special expert group (under
Michel Sauvage) was to trace the causes with German and British assistance. For the
time being, the reactor was down by instruction of the authority.
This Comite d'experts spent the next two years examining nearly one hundred possible
causes of transients of this type. Most of them were only theoretical in nature, and it
was neither credible nor demonstrable that they would ever occur in reality. By and
large, they could be summarized under three headings: void effects, as exemplified by
the gas bubbles; moderator and absorber effects, respectively, which could have oc-
curred when oil leaked into the sodium;
and geometry effects. The latter effects
were volume changes of the core and
relative motions of core internals, re-
spectively, which could have caused re-
activity changes. Finally, the Expert
Group confirmed that a radial variation
of the volume of the core was the most
plausible explanation without, however,
being able to clearly identify the initia-
tor. Because of a rather low energy im-
pulse, a "flowering" movement of the
core may have occurred, followed by a
spring-back effect which put the core (nearly) back to its initial geometry. In October
1992, the Iicensing authority approved a few test startups of Phenix at apower below
1 MWth which, however, did not produce any further information. Even ten days of
power operation at 350 MWth in February 1993 generated no further insights.
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The French licensing authority, now called Direction de la Surete des Installations
Nucleaires (DSIN), used the enforced outage of Phenix to look into other safety as-
pects of the reactor. For instance, it demanded an increase in the capacity of the emer-
gency decay heat removal system in line with the burnup of the fuel elements, which
had been raised from 80,000 to 130,000 MWd/t. There were various ways of achieving
this goal: either by introducing helium into the tank gap, or by removing insulation from
the outer vessel of the double-envelope vessel. The authority also imposed conditions
with respect to protection against seismic events.
But there was a different problem which proved to be even more time consuming and
more costly: Large parts of the secondary sodium circuits showed age-related cracking.
In the course of an intensive inspection and repair program, parts of the three circuits
made of 321 stainless steel, such as buffer tanks, were replaced and many affected
welds were inspected and had to be redone. One crack, over 35 cm long and extending
partly through the wall, was even found in a weid made of 304 steel. The failure could
be attributed to thermal fatigue induced by alternate flows of hot and cold sodium in a
mixing zone. Through-wall defects, although smalI, were also observed in expansion
tanks of the secondary system where they were likely to cause rather costly and time-
consuming repair work.
Let us now turn to Superphenix.
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By the summer of 1993, Phenix had been down for two years and a half, except for the
ten days of test operation in February mentioned above, mainly as a result of the reac-
tivity drop phenomenon and cracking in
the secondary ci rcuit. The restart of the
plant is foreseen in 1994.
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Two years after the incident with the
leaking storage vessel in March 1987,
Superphenix was granted the permit to
resume operation. In the meantime, a
decision had been taken to make the
new storage tank out of austenitic steel
and expose it only to argon; the Fuel
Transfer Station (FTS) was to be ready
by 1991. Recommissioning the power
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plant took all of four months. Moreover, the core had suffered a reactivity 1055 of some
56 full-Ioad days as a result of the conversion of plutonium to americium. The plant
regained full load for the first time on June 16, 1989; however, the rated power was
maintained only for one month, for turbo-generator A failed in August. In the autumn,
Superphenix was shut down for revision for an estimated period of six months. 176
Before the recommissioning date in spring 1990 there was an extensive discussion of
the possibility of Superphenix suffering similar reactivity incidents as Phenix. Because
of the rather high positive void coefficient in the central part of the core, the passage of
argon bubbles would not have been devoid of some risk. However, the operator was
able to demonstrate, together with CEA, that ample provision had been made against
gas sparging, and that the purging assemblies in the diagrid certainly were not plugged
up. After a sodium leak in the purification cycle had been repaired, Superphenix was
able to resume operation in April 1990.
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That phase of operation did not last very long. Already during startup, elevated plug-
ging temperatures were found in the primary sodium system and continued to rise ex-
cessively. In August, the plant
had to be shut down after only
thr€le weeks of power operation
because the filter cartridges of
the integrated primary purifica-
tion system were clogged. In-
vestigations of the reasons indi-
cated that the membrane of one
compressor had been defective
for a long time already, and the
argon cover gas therefore had
been exposed to atmospheric
air. There was no measuring in-
strument to monitor the purity of
the cover gas. The amount of
sodium oxide produced was estimated to amount to 300 - 350 kg. SUbsequent c1eaning
of the contaminated sodium took several months and was managed by the in-plant cold
traps.
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1990 ended with another regrettable event: On December 13, half of the roof of the
turbine building collapsed after the heaviest snowfall in the Creys-Malville region for
the past 130 years. Half a meter of wet and heavy snow had loaded the flat roof to a
level it was not able to sustain. Fortunately, the turbo-generator underneath was not
damaged seriously. Cleaning and repair work, however, took several months. In
addition, the incident had damaged the refueling flask stored in the turbine building,
which was required for fuel element transports without a "barillet."
A difficult situation ensued with respect to the Iicensing procedure. Initially, Super-
phenix had only had an operating permit for the Iimited duration of 160 full-Ioad days.
In August 1990, that permit had been extended to 405 full-Ioad days by Min-
isters Fauroux and Lalonde, which period covered the operating Iife of the first core.
However, a French-Swiss group of nuclear opponents raised objections to that deci-
sion, and the French Supreme Administrative Court, the Conseil d'Etat, surprisingly
ruled in favor of the opponents on May 27, 1991. The Court declared the permit grant-
ed by the two Ministers null and void on formal grounds, mainly because the conditions
for operation with the modified fuel element transfer had not been specified in the
permit decision. A difficult situation arose, also because there had been a change in
government in the meantime: The Minister for Industry, Fauroux, had been replaced by
Strauß-Kahn, and Prime Minister Rocard had been followed by Madame Cresson.
Strauß-Kahn, not noticeably a friend of breeder technology, ordered a painstaking re-
view of the technical safety of Superphenix by the DSIN safety authority.
DSIN and the Groupe Permanent des Reacteurs organization of expert consultants
(under Frangois Cogne as Chairman) consequently addressed not only the fuel transfer
station, which was up for Iicensing, but also more far reaching safety issues, such as
potential sodium fires in the secondary sector. The final report by DSIN of June 16,
1992, which had already been leaked to the "Liberation" newspaper and published
there, was a surprise, nevertheless. In very c1ear words, reference was made to alleged
weak spots in Superphenix (core reactivity, sodium fire in the secondary system, in-
spectability of the reactor vessel), and it was proposed to limit the operating permit of
the plant to 30% power and grant it for only a few months. 177,178,179
In the meantime, the time for renewing the operating permit had become very short.
Superphenix had been down since July 3, 1990 and, in accordance with French law,
would have lost its operating permit after two years of outage, which would have been
B~R~ • RELAN~ANT • SUPERPH~NIX
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on July 3, 1992.180 A few days before that date, on June 29, French Prime Minister
Pierre Ben3govoy took the decision himself. He issued the following decrees:181 ,182
(1) The safety report by DSIN shall be pub-
Iished.
(2) A number of engineered safeguards features
shall be added to the plant, especially to pro-
tect against sodium fires in the secondary
system.
(3) A public inquiry shall be organized at which
opponents and proponents of the project can
have their say before the new operating per-
mit will be granted.
(4) Minister for Research Hubert Curien was
commissioned to write areport indicating to
what extent Superphenix could be used for
transmutation of radioactive substances.
"B{lrE3g0VOY relaunching SuperpMnix"
(Le Canard enchaTne, July 1, 1992).
Backfitting measures in SuperpMnix.
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The report by Minister Curien was pre-
sented still in December 1992 and con-
firmed the usability of Superphenix
(and Phenix) for burning plutonium and
minor actinides. The public inquiry as a
precondition for the new operating per-
mit being granted began in March 1993
and was prolonged twice until June 15.
At the time of writing, December 1993,
the Chairman of the Committee of In-
quiry (Pronost) had submitted a broadly
positive report just before the Septem-
ber 30 deadline. The five Commission
members favor renewing the plant's li-
cense, provided the nuclear safety reg-
ulators from DSIN agree. They also re-
commend the use of Superphenix to
test burning plutonium and minor actini-
92
des. In a parallel step, NERSA has begun extensive modifications in the secondary
system, taking special care of the sodium fire risks. 183,184
1994 will become a very important year to Superphenix.
5.2 The End
The end of the EFR Project as defined in the agreements of 1984/1989 came almost
unnoticed. First, the governments, especially in the United Kingdom and in Germany,
withdrew from financing the Research and Development Program. Then the EFRUG
partners stopped financing the design companies. There was no need to give noisy
notice and, in this way, arouse special attention. As was customary in the government
sector, the R&D budgets anyway had to be revised and reallocated annually. EFRUG
had not entered into any obligations beyond the Concept Validation Phase, which
expired at the end of 1993 after a stretch-out beyond the original date of March 31,
1993.
This allowed the project to be "phased out," and this is precisely what happened.
5.2.1 The Governments Bow out
When it came to reducing the government grants-in-aid towards the R&D programs in
various research centers, the United Kingdom again took the lead, as it had done in
other phases of the project. This time, events were triggered off by the report of the
Select Committee on Energy, an all-party group on energy problems established by the
British House of Commons. 185 In mid-1990, the Select Committee submitted to the Gov-
ernment in London "The Fast Breeder Reactor," areport commenting critically on the
EFR Project. Doubt was expressed in particular of its economics, and the Government
was recommended not to approve astart of construction in 1997. Moreover, the project
was to be reviewed closely already in 1993,186,187 The Department of Energy, to which
the report had been addressed, published a memorandum in December 1990 in which
the report by the Select Committee was more or less approved. Project reviews were
announced for 1993 and 1997.188,189
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However, things moved even faster. 190 Already on November 19, 1992, the U.K. Oe-
partment of Trade and Industry (OTI), which was now responsible for matters of energy,
announced that it would stop financing R&O for the EFR Project effective March 31,
1993. At the same time', there were indications that the original decommissioning date
of March 1994 of PFR would not be moved, irrespective of the offer of financial as-
sistance made by the utilities one year ago. 191 The decision by the British Government
had been leaked to the press already, and its essence had been covered in the "Inde-
pendent" newspaper on November 2. Official confirmation followed on the date men-
tioned above, which happened to be the very day on which the European representa-
tives of the EFR Steering Committee met with high-level representatives from Japan
and USA at the ANS Conference in Chicago. This pu lied the carpet from under any co-
operation talks that may have been planned. The OTI initially agreed to finance the
phase-out period to the tune of E5 million annually, but soon the amount was slashed to
a total of E2.5 million over aperiod of three years. As a consequence, massive person-
nel cuts in the breeder sector were made at the British research centers, especially at
Risley. On March 31, 1993, most of the R&O teams were sent into early retirement or
deployed in other projects, frequently at other locations. 192
In Germany, the beginning of the withdrawal from the EFR Project can be dated
March 31, 1992. On that day, a discussion took place with Federal Minister for Re-
search Riesenhuber, who had invited representatives of Siemens and KfK and the Ger-
man EFRUG partners (RWE, PreußenElektra, and Bayernwerk). The Minister expres-
sed his willingness to continue to pay the R&O expense of the breeder program at the
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, but asked industry to finance not only the planning
activities but, in the future, also the development work at Siemens (formerly Interatom).
The amount in question ran up to an annual DM 20 - 25 million, mainly for such large
facilities as ILONA. No consensus was achieved in the discussion. The representatives
of industry considered financing the EFR-related R&O program an obligation of the
state to make provisions for long-term projects, while the Minister insisted that these
activities, because of their advanced state of development, had grown out of the realm
of government funding. As no agreement was reached, the Minister then announced
his intention to stop financing the R&O program at Bensberg. 193 ,194
And this is what he did, with major consequences. Immediately, R&O work at Interatom
was cut back drastically.195 On March 30, 1993, a memorandum by Siemens indicated
that the Bensberg location even would be given up entirely by late 1994. Most of the
breeder experts are currently being sent into (early) retirement, others are moved to
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other locations or simply fired. The sodium test facilities built at great expense, such as
ILONA or the 5 MW facility, are demolished; what technical documents are still existing
are microfilmed and put into a safe. For whom?
The refusal of the industrial partners to finance the R&D program of Interatom also had
grave impacts on the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center (KfK). At the Supervisory
Board meeting of November 24, 1992, the German Federal Ministry for Research and
Technology, the majority partner in KfK, requested the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research
Center to stop all activities for EFR by the end of 1993 and henceforth concentrate
mainly on research into light water reactor safety.196,197 The organizational reshuffle
this requires is currently under way, with similarly regrettable, though less drastic, im-
pacts on breeder personnel as in the cases of UKAEA and Interatom.
In France, there were also annual budget cuts by 10 - 15%, but there was no abrupt
backing out by the state. This may have a variety of reasons. On the one hand, the
R&D program of the French CEA for years had been financed roughly one third by the
state power utility, EdF. On the other hand, France is still operating Phenix and Super-
phenix, two large breeder facilities, which continue to need a certain backing of R&D.
Many research topics are important both to EFR and to the two power plants mentioned
above, and thus are necessary per se. One example are studies of the hot pool in EFR,
or the establishment of provisions against the ingress of argon gas. The results of this
R&D activity were directly transferable to Phenix and Superphenix when the problem of
reactivity shutdowns of those plants had to be discussed with the Iicensing authority.
5.2.2 The Withdrawal of EFRUG
The first movements indicating retrenchment by EFRUG became evident at the
top-level meeting in London on December 11, 1991. On that occasion, the top per-
sonnel of EFRUG, EFR.A, and R&D had met to evaluate the activities of the current
year and establish the main points of activity for the coming project period. 198
The meeting in '91 was ill-fated also because, at that time, the three large breeder
plants were down as a result of defects, namely PFR, Phenix and Superphenix.
SNR 300 had been stopped altogether for political reasons.
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The Chairman (Goddard, NE) in his introduction drew attention to this most regrettable
situation, expressing hope that this would not happen again in future. The practical
demonstration of plant availability was of overwhelming importance to the utilities, in-
deed was one of the most important parameters by which to assess new power plant
concepts.
The utilities seemed quite pleased with the progress made in the technical design of
EFR and the supporting R&D program. However, the economic data were accepted
with a certain amount of scepticism. EFRUG still thought the capital cost of EFR too
high. Compared with the most recent French pressurized water reactor line, the N4 re-
actor, EFR was likely to cost 50 - 70% more. The design companies therefore were re-
quested to look for further savings on the order of 20 - 30%.
Another important topic discussed at the top-level meeting was the timetable of the pro-
ject. The start of the pre-construction phase, which was Phase 3 of EFR, originally
scheduled for 1993, was considered to be premature by the utilities. They instead sug-
gested 1995 or an even later date; correspondingly, the beginning of the subsequent
construction phase was to be moved roughly to the year 2000. At the same time, how-
ever, EFRUG insisted on the current Phase 2 to be finanalized as scheduled, which
would be in March 1993.
This meant a gap of at least two years between Phase 2 and Phase 3, whose financial
coverage and program remained open, for the time being.
The next top~level meeting was held in Paris with a two months' delay on Febru-
ary 11, 1993. The reactor situation had not improved greatly: PFR had been recon-
nected to the grid a few days before, after nineteen months of outage, but Phenix and
Superphenix continued to be down for an unforeseeable length of time. In addition, the
Government had decreed the final decommissioning of PFR next year. Quite c1early,
the future scope of breeder operating experience in Europe would be much narrower,
which was bound to have a negative impact on the EFR Project.
The results elaborated in the Concept Validation Phase by EFR Associates and by the
R&D organizations were praised by EFRUG. Also cooperation among the groups and
among the participating countries had improved continuously. EFR had developed into
a truly European project whose structures served as models to be continued as far as
possible. 199
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The only point not solved was funding.
The Chairman (Bacher, EdF) asked the attending representatives of the utilities one by
one: RWE (Germany), ENEL (Italy), NE (UK), EOS (Switzerland), UNESA (Spain), EdF
(France). None of them were able to promise further funds for EFR. Reference was
made, among other items, to the difficult political circumstances and to Superphemix,
whose recommissioning was a matter of utmost priority.200
The Project of the European Fast Reactor EFR, had come to an end.
There were some proposals, though, for an EFR forward Programme. It included items,
such as scoping studies for a reduced-size prototype, continuation of basic work and
broadening of international cooperation. The discussion on participation and financing
among the potential partners is still going on.
Future will tell.
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TIMETABLE
1967
January:
February:
October:
1968
April:
December:
1969
January:
December:
December:
1970
August:
October:
October:
1971
First criticality of Rapsodie (Cadarache).
Containment completed of KNK (Karlsruhe).
Germany, Belgium, Netherlands sign MoU on
SNR 300 cooperation.
German AEG proposes to suspend gas breeder activities.
Consortium established for SNR 300 construction.
Start of Phenix construction
First criticality of Soviet BOR 60 reactor.
INB manufacturers' consortium presents safety
report of SN R 300.
Sodium leak (fire) in DFR.
Sodium filling of KNK I.
New site for SNR 300 proposed: Kalkar
(instead of Weisweiler).
May: KfK-PNC breeder cooperation agreement signed.
July 15:
August:
August:
September:
1972
January:
April:
August:
November:
December:
1973
April:
April:
August:
December:
120
EdF, ENEL, and RWE declare intent to build two large
breeder power plants.
First criticality of KNK I.
SEFOR transient tests performed.
Technicatome founded by CEA (90%) and EdF (10%).
Utility consortium for SNR 300 formed (SBK).
U.S. SEFOR test reactor shut down.
KNK I coupled to grid.
SBK awards contract for SNR 300 to INB.
Sodium filling of Phenix.
Start of construction of SNR 300 in Kalkar.
Nuclear divisions of AEG and Siemens establish KWU.
First criticality of Phenix.
Phenix coupled to the grid.
December 28: EdF, ENEL, and RWE sign European Utilities' Convention
on behalf of Superphenix and SNR 2.
1974
February:
March:
July:
September:
First criticality of PFR.
Phenix reaches full power.
NERSA founded in Paris.
KNK I operation completed.
121
1975
July:
December:
1976
Start of conversion of KNK 1into KNK 11.
Presentation of "Flowers Report" in the U.K.
(delay in breeder program).
January: U.K. becomes majority shareholder in NNC
(purchase from GEC).
February 13: Declaration of Nice by Franco-German Research Ministers
d'Ornano and Matthöfer.
March: Soviet BN 350 breeder reaches full power.
April: Novatome breeder manufacturing company founded.
April: Superphenix NSSS ordered.
May: K. Traube resigns Interatom Executive Board.
July: Leak in Phenix intermediate heat exchanger.
1977
March:
April:
July 5:
August:
October:
1978
March:
April:
DFR closed down.
U.S. President Carter announces new nuclear program
(no reprocessing, reduced breeder program).
French-German Breeder R&D and Industry Cooperation
Agreement signed in Paris.
Large demonstration near Creys-Malville Superphenix site.
First criticality of KNK 11.
Creation of SYFRA.
KNK 11 coupled to the grid.
July:
July:
September:
October:
December:
1979
March:
March:
1980
February:
April:
November:
December:
1981
January:
April:
July:
1982
January:
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SERENA founded.
Japanese JOYO attains full power.
German Minister Riemer proposes to use SN R 300 for
plutonium incineration (instead of breeding).
Construction of French TOR reprocessing plant in
Marcoule decided.
Committee of Inquiry into SNR 300 set up by
German Bundestag.
KNK 11 reaches full power.
German Committee of Inquiry starts work
(Chairman: R. Ueberhorst).
First criticality of U.S. FFTF reactor.
Soviet BN 600 breeder reaches full power.
Contractual delivery of KNK 11 from Interatom to KfK/KBG.
Joint INB-Novatome report on SNR 2 pool analysis submitted.
Problems with intercrystalline corrosion of SNR 300 vessel.
Continuation of German Committee of Inquiry
(Chairman: H. B. Schaefer).
Gas bubble problems in KNK 11.
Superphenix attacked with missiles.
April:
May:
September:
October:
October:
1983
June:
June:
September:
September:
September:
December:
1984
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Sodium-water leak in Phenix reheater.
Test of Superphenix neutron chambers in KNK 11.
Vote of German Committee of Inquiry in favor of
SNR 300 continuation.
CEA decides to shut down Rapsodie reactor.
Change in German Federal Government
(H. Kohl succeeds H. Schmidt).
ARGO breeder study group formed in Paris.
First criticality of second KNK 11 core.
Britain states wish to participate in European
breeder cooperation.
UKAEA fast breeder budget slashed 30%.
French safety authorities submit instructions on
Superphenix 2.
Final report on SNR 2 pool version (Phase 1c)
submitted.
January 10: European Fast Breeder Agreement signed by
five governments in Bonn.
January: CEA sets up CEA Industry (Chairman: G. Renon).
February: Agreement of EdF and CEGB to pool design and
development activities.
March: European Reactor MoU signed by R&D and industrial
organizations.
March 2: MoU about European R&D and industry FBR
cooperation signed.
March:
October:
October:
November:
1985
January:
February:
March:
May:
May:
July:
July:
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Two MoU for fuel fabrication and reprocessing signed by
Cogema, BNFL, CEA, and UKAEA.
French cabinet limits EdF to one reactor contract in
1985 and 1986.
Sodium filling of Superphenix.
R&D agreement initialed by partners.
FASTEC founded as joint venture of
NNC (60%) and AEA (40%).
Vibrations in Superphenix internal structures detected.
PFR reaches first full power.
Marshall Laboratory for fast fuel reprocessing studies
completed at Dounreay.
Construction of SN R 300 completed.
Postponement of signing ceremony of European breeder
R&D Agreements by H.-H. Haunschild, BMFT, Bonn.
First fuel element loaded into Superphenix.
September 7: First criticality of Superphenix.
October:
1986
January:
January:
April 26:
August:
December:
SNEAK reactor closed down at KfK;
converted into Tritium Laboratory.
Superphenix coupled to grid for the first time.
Superphenix costs quoted as approx. FF25 billion
(B. Saitcevsky).
Chernobyl accident.
German SPD decides to opt out of nuclear energy.
Dutch decide not to join European breeder cooperation.
December:
1987
March:
March:
March:
May 11:
June 28:
June:
September:
October:
November:
December:
1988
February:
April 1:
April:
May:
July:
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Superphenix reaches full power for the first time.
Interatom decides to reduce breeder staff.
KfK plans to reduce nuclear activities.
Sodium leak in Superphenix storage drum.
First meeting of joint European Fast Reactor Design Group
in Bensberg.
French Prime Minister Chirac orders investigation
into Superphenix barillet leak problem.
EFRUG agrees on common model breeder.
TRANSNUCLEAR affair on illegal shipment of wastes.
UKAEA and NNC discuss plans for European
Demonstration Reprocessing Plant (EDRP) at Dounreay.
Anti-nuclear referendum in Italy.
EdF decides to order no nuclear plant in 1988.
EFRUG and EFR.A decide to start design of EFR
(Bensberg meeting).
Start of EFR'Conceptual Design Phase (Phase 1).
Directives issued by German Federal Government to
North-Rhine Westphalian State Government.
EFR project presented at
Jahrestagung Kerntechnik in Travemünde, Germany.
U.K. Government (C. Parkinson) decides to stop PFR
in five years and slash R&D breeder budgets.
October:
December:
1989
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North-Rhine Westphalia sues German Federal Government
before Karlsruhe Federal Constitutional Court.
French safety authorities express general agreement with
RNR 1500 preliminary safety report.
January: French Government asks "three sages"
(Ph. Rouvillois, H. Guillaume, R. Pellat) to reflect on
future nuclear program.
January: Approval of Superphenix to resume operation till 9/89.
February 16: EFR Agreements signed in Bonn.
April: Framatome and KWU sign NPI-PWR Agreement.
April 21: Superphenix resumes operation.
April: "Cold fusion" euphoria.
May: Germany gives up Wackersdorf reprocessing plant.
June: Nuclear sages recommend R&D reorganization in France.
June 16: Superphenix reaches full power after two years' outage.
August: Scrams of Phenix due to "negative reactivity."
September: Approval of Superphenix continuing operation up to 405 efpd.
November: Creation of Management Group for Research and
Development, MGRD
(Chairman and Executive Director: W. Marth).
1990
January:
March 12:
April 1:
CEA reorganizes institutes into divisions.
J. Bouchard nominated as Director of the Nuclear
Reactor Division and J.-Y. Barre as Director of the
Fuel Cycle Division of CEA.
Start of EFR Concept Validation Phase (Phase 2).
April:
May:
July:
July:
July:
September:
Oetober 3:
Deeember:
1991
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Creation of Projeet Management Team, PMT, at Lyons
(Direetor: K. Ebbinghaus;
deputies: M. Debru and C. MitehelI).
Favorable Constitutional Court ruling on SNR 300.
J. Rastoin appointed Direetor of IPSN.
Sodium cold traps c10gged at Superphenix.
U.K. House of Commons Seleet Committee releases
unfavorable report on fast breeder future.
Swiss voters aeeept ten-year moratorium.
Reunifieation of West and East Germany.
Collapse of turbine generator roof due to heavy snowfall
at Superphenix.
March 20: SNR 300 abandoned.
May 27: Freneh Conseil d'Etat revokes operating lieense for
Superphenix.
July: X. Elier appointed Head of Phenix, Mareoule.
August 23: KfK shuts down KNK 11 after twenty years of operation.
Sept. 20: Phenix authorized for ten-days' restart.
Oetober 1: Interatom absorbed into Siemens/KWU parent eompany.
Oetober 28: Europe-Japan MoU on FBR signed in Kyoto.
Deeember: U.K. utilities pledge eontinued operation of PFR.
Deeember 11: EFRUG eonsiders delay of EFR by three years.
1992
March:
May 18:
Neptun test faeility started at KfK.
Freneh parliamentary hearing on Superphenix.
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June:
May:
June 29:
August:
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) formally asks
to join EFR Project.
DSIN (Laverie) recommends to limit Superphenix power
operation to 30% and reduce period of operation.
French Prime Minister Pierre Seregovoy makes statement
on Superphenix; consequence: operating license expires.
U.K. Government confirms 1988 decision to shut down PFR
by March 1994.
November 19: U.K. Government decides to stop financing EFR by
March 31, 1993.
November:
December:
Through-wall crack found in Phenix 2 secondary sodium
system.
French Research Minister Hubert Curion submits report on
use of Phenix/Superphenix as actinide burners.
1993
January: H. Krämer, Chief Executive Officer of PreußenElectra utility,
resigns.
February 11: EFRUG decides at top level meeting (Paris)
not to enter EFR Phase 3.
March 30: Siemens announces plans to abandon Sensberg site
(formerly Interatom).
April 30: Public inquiry on Superphenix opened (prolonged twice).
July: CEA announces new strategie orientation plan;
less emphasis put on fast breeder reactors.
September: J. Pronost, Chairman of Superphenix Inquiry
Committee, submits report.
September: UKAEA announces split into government and commercial
divisions.
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ME M B ER S *)
01 the Scientific and Managerial
Bodies
Comite de liaison (Cdl) / Steering Committee (SC)
France: C. Moranville, M. Rapin, J. Megy, G. Clottes, F. Stosskopf,
R. Lallement, J. Villeneuve, J. Petit, J. Bouchard, A. Chalot,
J. Rastoin, E. Benoist, J.-C. Lefevre, M. Sauvage, M. Livolant.
Germany/DeBeNe: H.-H. Hennies, KfK - H. Mausbeck, lA/Sie - G. Kessler, KfK -
E. Guthmann, lA/Sie - W. Marth, KfK - J. Höchel, lA/Sie -
I. Weisbrodt, lA/Sie - A. Brandstetter, lA/Sie -
M. Köhler, lA/Sie - D. Grosser, lA/Sie -
G. Heusener, KfK - P. Dejonghe, SCKlCEN -
J. A. Goodkoep, ECN - J. F. van de Vate, ECN -
G. Spaepen, SCK/CEN - H. Krinninger, lA/Sie.
Italy: C. Mancini, G. Cicognani, P. Venditi, A. Avanzini, F. Biagioli,
G. Villa, M. Covarelli.
United Kingdom: A. D. Evans, G. A. Welch, R. D. Smith, R. P. Hardingham,
K. M. Swanson, A. M. Broomfield, J. A. G. Holmes,
A. M. Judd, D. Broadley, C. V. Gregory.
Management Subcommittee (MSC) / Management Group R & D (MGRD)
France: J. Rastoin, M. Sauvage, M. Aubert.
Germany: E. Guthmann, lA/Sie - W. Marth, KfK - D. Grosser, lA/Sie -
G. Heusener, KfK.
United Kingdom: A. D. Evans, A. M. Broomfield, A. M. Judd.
*) during various phases of the Project.
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liaison Agents (LA)
France: E. Benoist, M. Asty.
France:
Germany/DeBeNe: E. Guthmann, lA/Sie - H. Ceulemans, SCK/CEN -
H. Buchholz, lA/Sie - G. Muehling, KfK.
Italy: P. Casalini
United Kingdom: G. E. I. Smith, N. Sheriff.
Technical Secretariat (T8)
A. Bel, R. Pontier, R. Moutonnet, H. Viallet, J. Kremser,
J. Costa, R. Petiot.
Germany/DeBeNe: H. Buchholz, lA/Sie - H.-J. Walter, lA/Sie - O. Götzmann, KfK -
A. Oe Bremaecker-Le Rigoleur SCK.CEN/KfK - B. Klemme, lA/Sie.
Italy: L. Pierazzi.
United Kingdom: D. M. Donaidson, D. Ockenden, D. J. Wilkes, A. Darke.
AGT National Coordinators & Chairmen
AGT 1
France: P. Delpeyroux, J. Leclere, A. Languille.
Germany/DeBeNe: M. Egleme, BN - J. M. Morelle, BN - G. Mühling, KfK -
A. Pay, BN.
Italy: R. Oe Maria
United Kingdom: K. G. Bagley, K. M. Swanson, C. Brown
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AGT2A
France: N. Lions, A. L. Champeix, D. Antonakas, J. Leclere.
France:
France:
Germany/DeBeNe: H. Schmidt, lA/Sie - R. Hans, lA/Sie - H. Reichei, lA/Sie -
K. Schillings, lA/Sie.
Italy: B. De Luca.
United Kingdom: A. D. Evans, A. Hamer.
AGT2B
N. Lions, A. L. Champeix, D. De Lapparent, C. Berlin,
J. P. Girard, J. Leclere.
Germany/DeBeNe: H. Schmidt, lA/Sie - R. Hans, lA/Sie - H. Reichei, lA/Sie -
W. Glauner, KfK - J. Voss, lA/Sie.
Italy: G. Marenco, R. Rappini.
United Kingdom: E. J. Burton, P. Thomas.
AGT3
J. C. Mougniot, Ph. Hammer, J. Recolin, A. Khairallah,
M. Salvatores, P. Bergeonneau.
Germany/DebeNe: R. Schroeder, KfK - S. Pilate, BN - R. De Wouters, BN -
F. Helm, KfK.
Italy: A. DeCarli, R. Tavoni.
United Kingdom: D. E. J. Thornton, R. F. Burstall.
132
AGT4
France: F. Penet, C. Le Rigoleur.
Germany/DeBeNe: G. Heusener, KfK - G. Vanmassenhove, SCK/CEN -
F. Hofmann, KfK.
Italy: M. Pezzi lIi
United Kingdom: B. Cowking, R. C. Wheeler, R. Stansfield.
AGT5
France: J. Ravier, A. Khairallah, E. LeBorgne, P. Bergeonneau.
Germany/DeBeNe: D. Markfort, lA/Sie - W. K. Biermann, lA/Sie - P. Kunsch, BN -
M. Fabry, BN - J. Heinecke, lA/Sie.
Italy: F. Cecchini.
United Kingdom: K. Eickhoff, K. Bagley, K. M. Swanson, A. M. Judd, P. Bramah.
AGT6
France: X. Elie, N. Lions, J. C. Bouchter.
Germany/DeBeNe: W. Jansing, lA/Sie.
Italy: V. Sestili, A. Chiasera.
United Kingdom: K. Eickhoff, A. M. Judd, M. Pilbeam, C. Betts.
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AGT7
France: A. Vial, D. Antonakas, A. Lafon, X. Elie, J. L. Carbonnier.
Germany/DeBeNe: A. H. de Haas van Dorsser, Ner - G. G. Hirs, Ner-
A. J. van t'Hoft, Ner - K. Dumm, lA/Sie - K. Förster, lA/Sie.
Italy: C. Salgo, P. Casalini.
United Kingdom: K. Eickhoff, A. M. Judd, M. Pilbeam, A. E. Collinson.
AGT8
France: A. Giudicelli, J.-M. Chaumont, X. Elie.
Germany/DeBeNe: W. Marth, KfK - B. Klemme, lA/Sie - K. Brockmann, INSie -
B. Hess, lA/Sie.
Italy: E. Santandrea.
United Kingdom: A. M. Broomfield, C. V. Gregory, E. R. Adam.
AGT9A
France: M. Weisz, P. Petrequin, M. Aubert.
Germany/DeBeNe: D. Grosser, lA/Sie - W. Dietz, lA/Sie.
Italy: C. Salgo, M. Covarelli, U. Conti.
United Kingdom: P. Nettley, K. Butler, C. Picker.
AGT9B
France:
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M. Livolant, A. Hoffmann, D. Acker.
Germany/DeBeNe: K. Vinzens, lA/Sie - H. Laue lA/Sie.
Italy: F. Corsi.
United Kingdom: J. F. W. Bishop, B. Tomkins, C. H. Townley, M. Hughes.
Delegates to France and Germany
for SPX 1/SPX 2 and SNR 300/SNR 2 experience exchanges:
H. Ballhausen, lA/Sie - R. Bryk, lA/Sie - H. Buchholz, lA/Sie -
M. Buchwalder, Nov - A. DeBremaecker-LeRigoleur, SCK.CEN/KfK -
L. De Cecco, ENEA - R. De Wouters, BN - C. Essig, lA/Sie -
K.-F. Freudenstein, lA/Sie - H. Giese, KfK - O. Götzmann, KfK -
A. Gouriou, CEA - J. Griner, Nov - R. D. Groot, Ner-
E. Guthmann, lA/Sie (German team leader) - W. Gyr, lA/Sie -
H. W. Hammers, lA/Sie - Ch. Heyne, lA/Sie - H. Höll, lA/Sie -
J. Hüsken, lA/Sie - B. Klemme, lA/Sie - R. Kußmaul, KfK-
J. Lallement, Nov - J.-C. Lefevre, Nov (French team leader) -
N. van Leuven, Ner - C. Lorin, CEA - V. Luster, lA/Sie -
B. Mesnage, CEA - J. C. Moisset, CEA - H. Nagel, lA/Sie -
R. Navez, BN - B. Percie de Cert, Nov - I. Ristow, lA/Sie -
F. Rohdenburg, lA/Sie - P. Sardain, CEA - W. Scholtyssek, KfK -
K. W. Schwitters, lA/Sie - A. Stanculescu, lA/Sie - L. Stevens, BN -
H.-J. Walter, lA/Sie - H. Wilhelm, lA/Sie.
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E;FR Associates
Supervisory Board: C. Berke, lA/Sie - W. Buerkle, INSie - J. G. Durston, NNC -
A. Green, NNC - M. Koehler, INSie - J. Leduc, Nov -
H. Noel, Nov - D. Taylor, NNC - D. A. Ward, NNC -
Y. Wilmart, Nov - J. Villeneuve, Nov.
Project Management Team (PMT):
K. Ebbinghaus, lA/Sie - M. Debru, Nov - C. H. MitcheII, NNC -
S. Bryant, NNC - D. Coors, lA/Sie - P. Fenemore, NNC -
Mrs. T. Fishleigh, NNC - R. Graham, NNC-
H. W. Hammers, lA/Sie - P. Lauret, Nov - A. LeBourhis, Nov -
J.-C. Lefevre, Nov - V. Luster, lA/Sie - C. Rossard, Nov -
A. Stanculescu, lA/Sie - G. Waldhoer, INSie.
local Project Manager:
H. Krinninger, lA/Sie - A. W. Mclntyre, NNC.
W<nking Groups • Secretaries:
D. Broadley, NNC - J. P. Debaene, Nov - J.-C. Lefevre, Nov -
F.-H. Morgenstern, lA/Sie - F. Pounder, NNC -
D. Stoetzel, lA/Sie - H. Vossebrecker, lA/Sie -
M. B. Wilkinson, NNC.
Engineering Tasks • Coordinators:
D. Banks, NNC - W. D. Barnes, NNC - B. DeBraquilanges, Nov -
M. Dostal, NNC - K.-H. Ducke, INSie - K. Franke, lA/Sie -
H.-J. Friedrich, lA/Sie - A. W. Mclntyre, NNC - J. Pugh, NNC -
G. Ruloff, lA/Sie - J. P. Serpantie, Nov - H. Stehle, lA/Sie -
J. Wagner, lA/Sie.
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EFRUG
EFRUG Board: P. Bacher, EdF - B. Broecker, PE - D. Brosche, BAG -
R. Carle, EdF - Y. Cousin, EdF - A.-W. Eitz, RWE -
H. U. Fabian, PE - R. S. Fidler, NE - S. C. Goddard, NE -
B. d'Ongia, ENEL - W. Ringeis, RWE - F. Velona, ENEL -
D. Vignon, EdF - E. Wild, BAG.
EFRUG Secretariat:
A. Broggiato, ENEL - J. Essmann, PE - R. S. Fidler, NE -
C. P. Haigh, NE - J. Journet, EdF - C. Satre, EdF -
L. J. Saunders, NE - H. Plank, BAG - A. Plessa, RWE -
U. Wolft, RWE.
Project Management Group (PMG):
M. Bailo, ENEL - J. Deckert, RWE - R. Dei Beccaro, EdF -
R. S. Fidler, NE - R. Riethmüller, RWE - G. J. Womack, NE.
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and locations of meetings
Year KfK (nteratoml CEA UK Location
DeBeNe CdL/SC
1977 Hennies Mausbeck Moranville
Guthmann Rapin
Megy Saclay (F)
Stosskopf
1978 Marth Höchel Lallement Bensberg (0)
Villeneuve Marcoule (F)
Petit Karlsruhe (0)
Gif-sur-Yvette (F)
1979 Kalkar (0)
La Hague (F)
1980 Karlsruhe (0)
Creys-Malville (F)
1981 Bensberg (0)
Pierrelatte (F)
1982 Weisbrodt Bouchard Bensberg (0)
Chalot
Paris (F)
1983 Rastoin Weinheim (0)
Rauffach (F)
1984 Benoist Evans London (UK)
Welch
Smith Rome(l)
HardinQham
1985 Swanson Avignon (F)
Chieming (0)
1986 Brandstetter LefEwre Broomfield Antwerpen (NL)
Holmes
London (UK)
Bologna (I)
1987 Judd Gif-sur-Yvette (F)
Cologne (0)
1988 Broadley Chester (UK)
Amsterdam (NL)
1989 Köhler Bouziges (F)
Grosser
Georgshausen (0)
1990 Heusener Sauvage Edinburgh (UK)
Toulause (F)
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Windsor (UK)
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Hamburg (0)
1993 Wilmslow (UK)
Creys-Malville (F)
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